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CHAPTER 1
PROTECTING NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS: EXAMINING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
In 1872, Congress established Yellowstone National Park as a
"public or pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the
people."* This legislation signaled the beginning of a new era in
federal land policy.

Federal land policy prior to 1872 is best de

scribed as one of acquisition followed by disposal (see Tables 1-1 and
1—2 ) By 1934, well over one billion acres of the public domain had
been disposed of, including grants to states and railroads, script,
purchase, preemption, and homesteading (see Tables 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3).
Even though Congress reserved Yellowstone in 1872, it was not
until 1891 that reservation of land by the federal government became a
major component of federal land policy. Specifically, the Forest
Reserve Act, part of the General Revision Act of 1891, altered federal
land policy by giving the president authority to withdraw forest land
from the public domain in order to reserve an adequate supply of
timber for future generations.3 The lands withdrawn under the Forest
Reserve Act form the vast majority of the National Forest System.
National Parks, Wildlife Refuges, and National Monuments have also
been created out of the public domain.^ Eventually, the public domain
was closed to private acquisition with the passage of the Taylor
Grazing Act of 1934. The grazing districts established by this act
eventually became part of the Bureau of Land Management.

While it is

true that some small parcels of federal land have been disposed of
during the last fifty years, the dominant policy has been one of

1

2

Table 1-1
inquisition of Federal Lands, 1781-1867, in acres
Land

Water

Total

State cessions
(1781-1802)

233,415,680

3,409,920

236,825,600

Louisiana Purchase
(1803)

523,446,400

6,465,280

529,911,680

Red River Basin
(1818)

29,066,880

535,040

29,601,920

Cession from Spain
(1819)

43,342,720

2,801,920

46,144,640

Oregon Compromise
(1846)

180,644,480

2,741,760

183,386,240

Mexican Cession
(1848)

334,479,360

4,201,600

338,680,960

Purchase from Texas
(1850)

78,842,880

83,840

78,926,720

Gadsen Purchase
(1853)

18,961,920

26,880

18,988,800

Alaska Purchase
(1867)

362,516,480

12,787,200

375,303,680

TOTAL

1,804,716,800

33,053,440

1,837,770,240

Acquisition

Source: U.S. Department of Interior, Public Land Statistics
(Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 3.
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Table 1-2
Important Federal Land Disposal Laws

Year

Price Per Acre

Size In Acres

Conditions

1785
(Ordinance
of 1785)

$1 minimum

640 minimum

Cash sale; amended in
1785 to provide for
payment of one-third in
cash, the remainder in
three months.

1800

$2 minimum

320 minimum

One-fourth of purchase
price paid within 30
days, then annual in
stallments of onefourth for three years
at 6 percent interest.

1820

$1.25 minimum

80 minimum

End of credit system;
cash payment only.

1830

$1.25 minimum

160 maximum

Squatters on public
domain allowed to pur
chase their tracts at
the minimum price (pre
emption) ; temporary
act, had to be renewed
biennially.

1841
(Preemption
Act)

$1.25 minimum

40 minimum;
160 limit on
preemption

Cash purchase only; estab
lished right of premption,
doing away with necessity
of renewing legislation.

1862
(Homestead
Act)

Zero

160 maximum

Payment of an entry fee
and five years continuous
residence; land could be
preempted after six months
residence for $1.25 per
acre cash.

1873
(Timber
Culture Act)

Zero

160 maximum

Cultivation of trees on
one-quarter of a 160-acre
required.
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Table 1-2
Continued

Year

Price Per Acre

Size in Acres

1873
(Desert Land
Act)

$1.25

1909
Homesteading
Act)

Zero

320

Five year's residence with
continuous cultivations.

1916

Zero

640

Designed for land useful
only for grazing.

1934
(Taylor
Grazing
Act)

---

1976
(Federal
Land Policy
and Management
Act)

640; reduced

Conditions

--

Required irrigation
within three years.

Established grazing districts on the remaining
federal lands and closed
the lands to private
settlement.
Reasserted the federal
government's intent to
retain ownership of fed
eral lands.

Source: Lance E. Davis et al., American Economic Growth: An Economist's
History
the United States (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 104-105.
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Table 1-3
Land Owned by the United States as of Fiscal Year 1979, in acres
Agency and Bureau

Public Domain

Acquisition

Total

Dept, of Agriculture:
Forest Service

166,002,139.6

27,534,259.6

187,536,399.2

627,182.0

701,758.3

1,328,940.3

Dept, of Interior:
Bureau of Land Management 395,155,545.5
38,686,169.8
Fish & Wildlife Service
61,547,222.6
National Park Service
4,684,991.6
Bureau of Reclamation

2.367.290.0
4.468.836.0
6,729,944.6
1.930.826.0

397,522,835.5
43,155,005.8
68,277,167.2
6,615,817.6

988,872.0

988,872.0

6.923.551.0
6.616.134.0
1,976,127.9

1.378.443.0
4.054.084.0
1,249,255.4

8,301,994.0
10,670,218.0
3,225,383.3

658,984.4

7,575,504.6

8,234,489.0

980,200.6

1,085,973.5

2,066,171.1

677,858,245.0

60,065,047.0

738,290,906.5

Dept, of Energy:
Energy K D Administration

Tennessee Valley Authority
Dept, of Defense:
Air Force
Army
Navy
Corps of Engineers
All Other Agencies
TOTAL
Source:

----

U.S. Department of Interior, Public Land Statisticsr pp. 10-12.

scientific management of federal land by federal bureaucracies. The
government has also acquired a considerable amount of land for addition
to the system of forests, grasslands, monuments, parks, and refuges.
Today the federal government owns over 700 million acres of land
(approximately one-third of the total United States land area), and
numerous federal agencies are involved in the management of natural
resources (see Table 1-3).

This shift in federal land policy (since

the American Revolution) can be described as a shift from a policy of
establishing private property rights to a policy of maintaining or
establishing public rights to land.

Though the reasons for this shift

are varied and complex, one component is the view that the government
(or state) is required for the protection of natural environments,
such as parks and refuges. Today this view is the dominant (or con
ventional) view held by bureaucrats, environmentalists, and most
American citizens.

In fact, one noted environmental historian, Rod

erick Nash, has articulated the essence of this view by asserting the
"fact that without formal (i.e. government) preservation the remaining
American wilderness would vanish."5
Despite these attitudes (and resulting government policies),
there is considerable evidence that questions the wisdom of this
conventional view.

In particular, there is evidence that the private

sector does protect natural environments and that public management
often degrades natural environments. The evidence below is presented
to provide examples contrary to the traditional view of the role of
the state in protecting natural environments.
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Privately Protected Natural Environments
The place to begin an examination of private sector protection of
natural environments is perhaps Great Britain, where the modern pri
vate property-market economy originated.

In English law there is

precedent for private ownership of wildlife in reference to such
"royal species" as the swan and the whale owned by the English king.®
(The current extent of privately owned wildlife in England is not a
subject of study examined in this paper.)
also has precedent in English law.

Private rights to water

In Pollution. Property and EtlCSSf

Dales described the British system of property rights to water with
respect to pollution control and stream quality.

He found that pro

perty rights to fresh water fisheries were well-defined and enforced
through the Gommon Law.^ For decades, centuries in some cases, water
use allocation has been through private (market) transactions.

In the

United States, however, private ownership of wildlife or instream
water is still not considered a legal possibility.
While my research suggests that much of the natural environment
protection in the private sector is relatively recent (within the last
25 years), there were private sector responses as early as the late
1800s. Tober reported that farmers in Pennsylvania began leasing

p

their land to sportsmen's association for hunting as early as 1877.

Tober also described the establishment of private game preserves that
began in Pennsylvania in 1871 and were designed after their European
counterparts.^ Initial membership fees for the first game preserveshooting club were $450 (approximately $4,000 in 1983 dollars); today,
memberships to similar waterfowl clubs in California's Sacramento
Valley are as high as $65,000.-*-® Tober found that by 1894 "thirty-two
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clubs controlled 824f112 acres" in the Adirondack Mountains of New
York state.** Similar private preserves were being established else
where.

In Tober's words,

"Principal coastal preserves were found at

the south shore of Long Island, the upper Chesapeake Bay, tidewater
Virginia, the Currituck Sound, and the Suisan marshes of California;
inland preserves were maintained along the Illinois, lower Missis
sippi, Sacramento, and San Juaquin rivers and at Michigan's St. Clair
Flats."*2
There are also cases of private sector wilderness preservation
prior to the modern environmental movement. John D. Rockefeller
purchased 30,000 acres in the Jackson Hole Valley of Wyoming and
deeded them to the federal government, providing land for the bulk of
Grand Teton National Park.** Rockefeller's family also provided core
lands for the Great Smokie's National Park and Acadia National Park
(see Appendix A). Percival P. Baxter, one-time governor of Maine,
donated a 200,000-acre preserve containing Mt. Katahdin (Maine's tallest
peak) to the state as a wilderness park now known as Baxter State
Park.14
In addition to these early private sector efforts there has been
a considerable amount of privately protected natural environments in
recent times (see Appendices B and C).

Private nonprofit conservation

organizations have protected over 6 million acres through outright
land ownership as well as through lease and easement contracts (see
Appendix B).

Profit-seeking institutions are protecting natural

environments by providing such goods and services as stream reclamation,
hunting and fishing access, wildlife habitat, outdoor recreation, and
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recreation management (see Appendix C). In addition, many firms use
easements or covenants to maintain or enhance environmental quality on
or adjacent to their development projects.

Below are two examples of

privately protected natural environments. The first example is the
Cross Ranch (North Dakota) and the second is the International Paper
Company.

The Cross Ranch example will illustrate how a nonprofit

organization protects natural environments.

The International Paper

Company example will show how a profit-seeking firm is able to benefit
from protecting such natural environments as wildlife habitat, recrea
tional lands, and scenic-amenity areas.

Example:

The Cross Ranch

The 10,000-acre Cross Ranch in North Dakota fronts the
Missouri River along its west bank roughly 30 miles northwest of
Bismarck. From a natural flood plain flanking the river, the
land rises through terraces and eroded breaks into rolling upland
prairies that are virtually treeless. The trees are to be found
along the river and in woody draws among the breaks.15
This central North Dakota ranch was established during the 1880s
by A.D. Gaines, a former professor of classical languages at the
University of Minnesota and a land agent for the Northern Pacific
Railroad.1^

In 1926, Gaines' son, Bert, took over the ranch.

It was

Bert Gaines who acquired Theodore Roosevelt's Maltese Cross brand and
named the ranch Cross Ranch.

Thirty years after Bert Gaines took over

the ranch, he sold it to Robert Levis, an Alton, Illinois, businessman-farmer.

In January 1982, The Nature Conservancy purchased the

Cross Ranch for $2.7 million for the purpose of preserving the ranch's
unique heritage.

The Nature Conservancy is a private nonprofit conser-
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vation organization established to preserve natural areas.

Since its

inception in 1950r The Nature Conservancy has preserved over 2.8
million acres through purchase, easement, and assistance to government
agencies.17 The Cross Ranch is but one small example of the
Conservancy’s preservation efforts.
The last individual owner, Robert Levis, sought to preserve the
ecological, archaeological, and historical values of the Cross Ranch
and had offered the ranch for sale (below market price) to the state
of North Dakota as a state park.

In 1979, the state legislature

approved funds to purchase the ranch from Mr. Levis. However, in
September 1980, North Dakota voters defeated this legislation in a
statewide referendum. After this vote, The Nature Conservancy became
involved in an effort to purchase the ranch from Levis who still
desired to preserve the ranch.

Upon purchase of the ranch, Levis

agreed to provide The Nature Conservancy with $1 million for long-term
management funds.

In fourteen months, $1.5 million was raised from

corporations, foundations, and individuals.
The fact that The Nature Conservancy was unable to raise all of
the $2.7 million forced them to reconsider their original intentions
of preserving 7,000 acres of the 10,000-acre ranch. Current plans to
are to sell 4,600 acres and only preserve the remaining 5,400 acres as
a natural area.

During the summer of 1982, 1,300 acres of cultivated

land were leased for farming, pending a more favorable market for land
sale.

In order to insure land use that was compatible with natural

area management, Hie Nature Conservancy restricted the uses of the
ranch land it sold to those compatible with the rest of the preserve
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(see Appendix D). For example, Hie Nature Conservancy reserved all
mineral rights to the land for sale and restricted land use to agri
cultural and grazing only.

In addition, they reserved the right to

approve any residential or commercial construction on the land as well
as access and excavation rights for any archaeological research that
would not "unreasonably interfere with the buyer's agricultural use of
the property."
Currently, the Cross Ranch is being managed to preserve Missouri
River bottomland, Indian archaeological sites, the frontier town of
Hensler, North Dakota, and the prairie wildlife.

The ranch is open to

the public at no charge, and a live-on manager oversees the operation
of the preserve.

Hiking and fishing are allowed; archeaological

studies continue; grazing is used as a management tool and a revenue
source; and fire and hunting are planned as potential management tools
to enhance the environment. As such, the ranch is an example of how
private nonprofit conservation organizations protect natural environ
ments.

Example: International Paper Company-*-®
Hie International Paper Company (IP) is a major industrial forest
corporation and the largest private landowner in the United States.
IP owns approximately 7 million acres of forestland: 5 million in the
Southeast, 1 1/2 million in the Northeast, and 1/2 million in the
Pacific Northwest. IP has annual sales of approximately S5 billion
and is considered a very successful enterprise.

In addition, IP has
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developed an extensive and profitable wildlife and recreation manage
ment program.
Since the 1950s, IP has earned revenue through the sale of hunt
ing leases.

Much of their land is leased to hunting clubs? in recent

years, the total has been 1.65 million acres at an average price of
$.83 per acre annually.1-9 The bulk of the research and planning work
for IP's wildlife programs is conducted at the company's 16,000-acre
Southlands Experiment Forest located near Bainbridge, Georgia.

The

forest was established in 1957 to investigate the potential of profit
able wildlife management.

Today, IP employs five specialists with

M.S. degrees in wildlife biology who oversee wildlife and recreation
on all of IP's land except those holdings in the Pacific Northwest.
Research at Southland is primarily concerned with the development of
forest management practices that enhance wildlife populations as well
as profitability.
Because game animals are typically more valuable than nongame
species, most of the research and management is directed at such
species as turkey, pheasant, quail, waterfowl, and whitetailed deer.
However, IP research foresters have conducted valuable research on
such nongame fauna as bluebirds and gopher tortoises.

One current and

major study involves radio-tracking wild turkeys in Alabama.

IP's

wildlife research has become increasingly accepted in the scientific
community and has produced benefits beyond those that can be captured
by the company.

In fact, IP currently commits more acreage to managed

wildlife production than any single state game agency in the United
States.
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Leasing land to hunting clubs is but one of several wildlife
management schemes IP uses.

Some land is leased to state agencies for

wildlife management; some is open for day hunting permits by species
(individual permits on non-club land has averaged $.62 per acre annu
ally); and some of the land with little hunting demand is simply open
to public hunting at no charge. IP also allows fishing on much of its
land and leases fishing rights in areas where it has control of an
entire lake; to date, however, revenue from fishing leases has been
insignificant. In conjunction with its wildlife program, IP also is
involved with such outdoor recreation projects as nature trails and
canoe areas; currently, IP charges nothing for the use of these fa
cilities and views them primarily as good public relations policy.
Another aspect of IP's management policy that is important for
this paper is its cooperation with nonprofit conservation organiza
tions to preserve natural areas. IP has worked with Hie Nature Con
servancy and numerous local conservation organizations to preserve
areas of unique ecological and geological value.

IP has aided these

groups by both selling and donating land. Because such actions are
considered charitable gifts, there are often significant tax advan
tages in moving land into a protective use type.

International Paper

Company, by utilizing a variety of management tools and contractual
arrangements, is an example of how profit-seeking firms can prosper
from the protection of natural areas.
Public Failures In Protecting Natural Environments
While the evidence that shows the private sector to be successfully
protecting natural environments has been growing, so has the evidence that

shows that the public sector has degraded natural environments. As
previously mentioned, reservation and bureaucratic management of the
public domain originated largely as a response to the nature of free
enterprise, which was often perceived as rapacious and short-sighted,
especially with regard to forest resources. Bernard Fernow, for
example, a professional forester in the Division of Forestry (the
precursor of the Forest Service) and author of Economics q £ Forestry,
wrote:
We will see, that the forest resource is one which, under
the active competition of private enterprise, is apt to deteri
orate, and its deterioration to affect other conditions of mate
rial existence unfavorably; that the maintenance of continued
supplies as well as of favorable conditions is possible only
under the supervision of permanent institutions with whom present
profit is not the motive. It calls pre-eminently for the exer
cise of the providential functions of the state to counter-act
the destructive tendencies of private exploitation.20
Fernow was associated with what has been termed the "progressive
conservation movement," along with such men as Theodore Roosevelt and
Gifford Pinchot.2-^ Conservationists in the progressive tradition
criticized the private management of natural resources and were in
strumental in establish policies that reserved land for public manage
ment.22 Scholars of American history have typically subscribed to the
view that the progressive conservation movement was the beginning of a
long overdue change in federal natural resource policy.2^ Roy M.
Robbins, a noted public land historian, summarized the conventional
historical view:

15

No nation in the world had so wasted its natural
resources or opened up its natural treasure to unbridled
exploitation as had the United States of America. But a halt
had been called. The grizzled, hardheaded pioneer of the
American West and the ever-grasping corporation stood face to
face with the challenge of a new American order which demanded
an end to the reckless and wasteful methods of the era of
laissez-faire. The task which remained was not only to recover
lost ground, and to preserve the fragments that were left, but
also to educate the public on the intelligent use of the remain
ing resources. This was a herculean task. Already the best of
forest lands had been acquired, by fair means and foul, and the
nation’s rights in these resources reduced to a minute percent.
In fact, many authorities thought that it was already too late.
But governmental authorities insisted that there was still
much good land left* and that immediate steps should be taken
for its protection.24
Recent developments in the economics literature, however, suggest
that many of the assertions made by progressive conservationists and
their contemporaries are, in fact, not well-founded.

For example,

Libecap and Johnson found, contrary to the views of conservationists,
that "costly Federal land policy encouraged fraud and theft" in American
forests.2^

They noted that conservationists based many of their

arguments for establishing a forest reserve system on timber fraud and
theft, especially in the Pacific Northwest.

Because government policy

ignored the economies of scale involved in logging operations by
legally restricting private land claims to 160 acres, timber men
allocated a substantial amount of valuable resources to skirting the
law ("fraud") in order to establish property rights to tracts of
timber that were large enough to be economically viable. Libecap and
Johnson document the activities of so-called "entry men" who were
agents employed by timber companies to legally establish rights to
land and then turn them over to their employer for a fee. Since the
costs of "fraud" were real and significant, "the value of the land had
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to be more than double the figure had there been no restrictions. °
These costs, in essence, postponed the establishment of property
rights and prolonged the period of common property, and this "delay

contributed to the very timber theft that was used by conservationists
to justify the creation of National Forests."2^ Libecap and Johnson
further pointed out that "ironically, fraudulent activity which hastened
the transfer of land from the public domain to the private sector
reduced the frequency of timber theft." In addition, Libecap and
Johnson found that "timber companies were not rapidly cutting their
holdings" and that Gifford Pinchot (the first U.S. Forest Service
chief) actually criticized timber owners for not producing.
In a later article, Johnson and Libecap examined market effi
ciency with respect to the harvest of timber in the Great Lakes region
(Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin) during the last half of the 19th
century.28 In examining the allegation made by early conservationists
that markets were unable to account for increasing resource scarcity
and that profit-seeking timbermen would ultimately exhaust their re
source, Johnson and Libecap found that "the [timber] market not only
operated in a manner consistent with the efficient market hypothesis,
but that future demand and supply conditions for lumber were estimated
accurately." Their examination of lumber and stumpage prices indi
cates that the market adjusted smoothly to changing resource values
and inventories and that nc major price shocks existed that would
indicate a sudden realization that timber was a finite resource.
Timbermen, in fact, harvested with prices (a measure of relative
scarcity) in mind.
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Johnson and Libecap further found that timber theft in the Great
Lakes region was negligible and that property rights were established
prior to major harvest operations.

They also found that speculators

held virgin old-growth timber off the market for as long as 20 years
in expectation of stumpage price increases.

They also refuted the

allegation that rapid timber harvest led to mass flooding in the Great
Lakes region; evidence supporting this claim was not found. While
conservationists were alarmed that early timber harvest was exceeding
the timber growth rate# Johnson and Libecap pointed out that "wealth
maximization does not# in general# imply that growth should equal cut
except at some steady state solution." In fact# downward inventory
adjustment is quite rational with large stocks such as those faced by
timbermen during the 19th century.

In short# the Johnson and Libecap

study indicated that when property rights are secure# markets "develop
early and effectively to allocate resources over space and time."
In another study# Berck analyzed the assertion that private
timber owners have overharvested their forests with regard to the
socially optimal level.^

in his examination of timber harvest rates

in the Douglas fir industry# Berck found "that private entrepreneurs
holding rational expectations with respect to future prices have
historically been discounting the future at a real rate of 5 percent—
a much lower rate than that available for other private investments—
and# therefore# that these owners have not cut their forests prema
turely." Berck's findings contradict the allegations of timber famine
that have been common since the days of Gifford Pinchot. It is also
worth noting that the timber market (which has been largely free of
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price controls) where prices have risen much faster than the cor
responding prices of crude oil has not brought the nation to its knees
with a "timber crisis" (see Table 1-4).
With regard to range management, Libecap's Locking Up ihe £ang£»
an analysis of federal range land controls, pointed to the insecure
nature of property rights to the range as the cause of many range
on

management problems, such as overstocking and underinvestment.^
Libecap also noted that restrictive federal range policy increased the
costs of establishing property rights and hence prolonging the overgrazing problem associated with the common property ownership. While
overgrazing problems on the range can be largely attributed to common
ownership during the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th
century, the problem of underinvestment in fencing, water storage, and
so forth can be largely attributed to the tenuous nature of property
rights subjected to the fluctuating politics of bureaucratic manage
ment.

Libecap's study suggested that market allocation has not been

the cause of range conservation problems, but rather the insecurity of
property rights to the range has often prevented markets from moving
resources to their highest valued uses.
Since John Wesley Powell's exploration of the American Southwest
in 1869, there has been concern over the development and conservation
of water resources in the arid Western states. Powell strongly urged
the government to actively involve itself in the "reclamation" of the
West.-** Along with other progressives, Powell felt that the private
sector could not muster the capital required for necessary water
development and that water monopolies would dominate the region; only
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Table 1-4

Comparison of Timber and Petroleum Prices, 1945-1980

Year
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

(Stumpage
In $/1000 Board Ft.)
Douglas Fir
$

5.00
6.60
9.90
19.90
11.10
16.40
25.40
25.80
20.20
16.20
28.90
37.70
26.20
21.80
36.80
32.00
27.60
24.80
27.90
38.10
42.60
50.00
41.70
61.20
82.20
41.90
49.00
71.70
138.10
202.40
169.50
176.20
225.90
250.30
394.40
432.20

(Avg. Value at
Well Per Barrel)
Crude Petroleum
$ 1.22
1.41
1.93
2.60
2.54
2.51
2.53
2.53
2.68
2.77
2.77
2.79
3.09
3.01
2.90
2.88
2.89
2.90
2.89
2.88
2.86
2.88
2.92
2.94
3.09
3.18
3.39
3.39
3.89
6.74
7.67
8.14
8.57
8.96
12.64
21.19

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics Qt the United
States» Colonial Times
1970, bicentennial ed., part 1 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 547, 593; idem, Statistical Abstract
fit the U«S.» 1981. 102d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1981), pp. 706, 723.
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through federally funded projects could adequate and equitable water
resource development take place. The passage of the New land's Reclama
tion Act in 1902 established the Bureau of Reclamation (originally
i

named the Reclamation Service) and firmly involved the federal govern
ment in the water development business. Research by Anderson, how
ever, suggests that the market system was falsely accused of being
unable to handle the allocation of water for irrigation and municipal
uses.32
Anderson documented the evolution of the prior appropriation
doctrine, which established transferable rights to consumptive water
use, and the scope of private water development.

Anderson found pri

vate water development for irrigation and municipal uses to exist in
significant amounts prior to the advent of widespread government
involvement in water projects.33 .By 1890, there were already 3.6
million acres of Western land with privately developed water re
sources.

Anderson's research suggests that the progressive's concern

for adequate water development in the West via markets was largely
unwarranted and that the concern of Powell et al. with water monopoly
"has little empirical basis."34
The evidence presented above contradicts the traditional view
that the private sector was wasteful and inefficient in its allocation
of natural resources.

In addition to this evidence, there has been

considerable research indicating that public management of natural
resources has often been inefficient and degrading to natural environ
ments. One of the ways this inefficiency manifests itself is in the
establishment of physical output maximization rules for resource
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management.^

In contrast to an economic decision rule, which

attempts to maximize net discounted present value (NDFV), physical
maximization rules seek to maximize such things as board feet of
timber or animal unit months of forage production. As such, these
physical maximization rules ignore costs, interest rates, and net
revenue.

Because these factors are not calculated into the decision

making process, site specific investment is often suboptimal. For
example, on national forest lands, low quality timber growing sites
are often harvested at a net economic loss, while superior sites often
receive less investment than is optimal.
Numerous studies have documented the inefficient management of
public resources.

Clawson has estimated that the U.S. Forest Service

was operating at an annual loss in 1974 of approximately $2 billion,
even when inputed values for non-market goods (recreation, wildlife,
etc.) were valued generously.®®

More important for this paper is the

fact that such inefficiency has often led to the degradation of na
tural environments.®7 Much of the research in this area has focused
on the Forest Service.

Hyde, for example, found that 3.2 million

acres of public forest land in the Pacific Northwest were allocated to
timber production despite the fact that these lands were unprofitable
for timber production.®® Hyde showed that the region's recreationalwilderness land base could be tripled if efficient forest management
was practiced.
Hyde conducted a similar analysis of the San Juan National Forest
OQ

in Colorado, where wilderness and recreational use is very high.
Despite the high value of the forest as an amenity resource, the
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Forest Service was expanding an already marginal timber program into
419,000 acres of roadless areas where roading costs alone exceeded the
stumpage value of the timber.

More recently, Sample found that total

timber management costs for the San Juan National Forest in fiscal
year 1981 were $3,479,595 while timber receipts were only $461,158.40.
Translated into dollars per thousand board feet (mbf), costs were
$79.63 and receipts were $10.55} costs did not include reduced recreation-wildemess values due to lumbering activities. The work of
Barlow et al. supports the analyses by Clawson, Hyde, and Sample.41
In the Tongass National Forest (Alaska), Barlow found that in recent
years the Forest Service lost over $10 million annually, largely
because of the agency's original miscalculation of the standing timber
inventory.42 Despite this, Tongass forest planners have called for
increased harvest during the next decade. Barlow estimated that annual
costs for these planned harvests will be aproximately $80 per mbf
while receipts will average $25 per mbf annually.
All of these studies suggest that National Forest managers have
degraded natural environments by expanding timber harvest programs
into areas that are more highly valued for recreational-wilderness
use.

Hyde, for example, summarized his San Juan study by stating that
wilderness values would be better preserved on this land if
it were privately owned, because no profit-oriented owner
would bother to cut down the trees. This is a somewhat para
doxical conclusion, since profit-seeking is frequently
thought of as leading to environmental degradation, which
must in turn be mitigated by government regulation.

Similar conclusions have been drawn by researchers who have studied
other publicly managed natural resources.

Lanner found that the
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Forest Service and the Bureau of land Management (BLM) have "chained"
vast acreages of pinyon-juniper woodland at an economic loss.44
Chaining, a range management tool in which crawler tractors drag log
chains over the ground to remove small trees in order to encourage
forage production, is not only environmentally degrading but it fails
to pass a standard benefit-cost test.

Lanner reported that nearly 3

million acres were chained frpm 1950 to 1964; from 1960 to 1972 the
BLM chained over 250,000 acres in Utah alone.
Other studies have shown that public agencies often subsidize
development of natural environments through loans, grants, and insur
ance programs, as well as through publicly funded development pro
jects. A few examples are found below. On the Navajo Indian Reserva
tion, tribal officials and federal agents (with the Bureau of Indian
Affairs) have institutionalized common property grazing practices that
have led to overgrazing on the range.4^ Nearly twenty different
federal agencies are involved in subsidizing the development and
redevelopment of the nation's system of coastal barrier islands.46
For over three generations, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army
Corps of Engineers have been building dams, channelizing streams, and
draining wetlands; in the process, natural environments have been
degraded by programs that often lack net economic justification.4^
Federal energy policy, by controlling prices and subsidizing costly
projects, has artificially induced increases in energy demand, de
graded natural environments, and hindered the development of alterna
tive energy sources.4® Wildlife populations, such as the grizzly
bear, have also suffered from public management objectives.4^
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objectives and Organization
The evidence presented in the last two sections contradicts the
conventional view that public ownership or management of natural
resources is required for the protection of natural environments.
Specifically, there is considerable evidence that the private sector
often protects natural environments and that the public sector often
degrades these areas.

The purpose of this professional paper is to

examine the economic logic behind this fact.

Why do private institu

tions protect natural environments in certain cases and why do public
institutions degrade them in certain cases?

In the next three chap

ters, I will apply existing economic theory to these questions. From
the start it is assumed that the evidence presented above is amenable
to such analysis and is not simply a gathering of chaotic and coinci
dental events.
Before beginning the analysis, it is useful to clarify some of
the terminology that will be used in this paper.

"Natural environ

ments" is taken to mean any natural resource valued for its amenity,
recreational, wildlife, or wildland values.

This would include scenic

areas, wildlife habitat, open space, and wilderness backcountry. The
term "natural areas" will be used synonymously with natural environ
ments.
made.

A distinction between "public" and "private" should also be
"Private" and "private sector" refer to any nongovernmental

institution, that is any institution that receives revenue voluntarily
and has no monopoly on coercive police power.

"Public" or "public

sector" is the converse? such institutions receive revenue through
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such involuntary means as taxation and are backed by coercive police
power.

"State" will be used synonymously with "government."

This professional paper will be organized in the following manner:
Chapter 2 will examine the economic rationale for both public and
private protection of natural environments.

The case for public

protection will rest on traditional market failure analysis, while the
case for private protection will be based on the paradigm of the "New
Resource Economics." Chapter 3 will be an economic analysis of pri
vately protected natural environments and will emphasize the property
rights paradigm within neoclassical economics. The final chapter will
be an examination of the mechanisms of private protection and an
application of the property rights theory (described in Chapter 3) to
the evidence shown above. Chapter 4 will also include a section on
alternative institutional arrangements that might further enhance the
ability of the private sector to protect natural environments.
A few remarks concerning an economic perspective of natural
resources is in order.

First, economics as a social science is con

cerned with value, not money, profit, or physical output.

Likewise, a

developing, changing economy means that resources are continually
being moved to higher valued uses whether these new uses are steel
beams, computers, or wildlife preserves.

In fact, it is the entrepre

neur, by finding higher valued uses for resources, who provides eco
nomic development and essentially provides society with a "free
lunch." Economic development or growth does not simply mean more cars
or more subdivisions. The most efficient economic system is one that
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produces the most value for society's individuals from the available
resources.

It must be realized that value is of a subjective nature.

Some people value the Rocky Mountains for their beauty and wilderness,
some for their timber or minerals.

(Actually, most people value them

for all of these goods, although they do so to varying degrees.)

An

economist is in no position to distinguish which of these values are
morally superior to the others. His analysis can only show that the
values exist (in the form of demands) and that different institutions
will allocate resources in ways that can change the total value de
rived from those resources.
In this professional paper, a key question implicit in much of
the text will be: How does one create institutions that allow the
public sector to protect natural environments with legitimate public
good characteristics without undermining the ability of the private
sector to do the same and without creating an environment conducive to
resource-wasting political bargaining? This question is essentially
what three economic historians have called the "basic dilemma of
political economy."^ Hie analysis put forth in this paper is an
attempt to solve one aspect of this "dilemma."
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CHAPTER 2
ECONOMICS AND THE LOGIC BEHIND PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS
Both public and private institutions have been used to protect
natural environments.

The evidence presented in Chapter 1 suggests

that private institutions have performed better than expected and that
public institutions have performed worse than expected.

In this

chapter, I will examine why this has been the case; concurrently, I
will examine the economic rationale for establishing both public and
private institutions to protect natural areas.

Market Failure; The Case for Public Institutions
Within the context of economic theory, most of the goods and
services associated with protection of natural environments (wildlife
habitat, scenic vistas, and wilderness) have been analyzed via the
theory of market failure. More specifically, market failure regarding
natural environments typically focuses on the problems of externality,
public goods, and common property. The problem of monopoly, although
an acknowledged market failure problem, is of little importance in the
natural resource matters addressed in this professional paper.

The

following section will examine the three components of market failure
with respect to the protection of natural areas. When markets fail to
efficiently allocate resources, economists have suggested that public
institutions be established to allocate those resources in an effi
cient manner.
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Externality
Externalities (or spillovers) have been the overwhelming argument
for government intervention in a market economy.

Externalities occur,

and they may be "positive" or "negative" when all of the impacts of
economic activity are not born by the decision maker.1 When either
type of externality occurs, production will deviate from the social
optimum. Externalities exist precisely because private costs and
benefits are not equated with social costs and benefits.
"Negative" externalities arise when the marginal social costs
(MSC) of some activity exceeds the marginal private cost (MPC) (see
Figure 2-1).

In such a case, private output (Qp) is greater than

prescribed by economic efficiency criterion (Q*). The greater the
difference between social and private costs, the greater the misallocation. Air pollution is often cited as a classic example of a nega
tive externality.

Because the cost of using the environment as a

waste dump is less for the polluter than for rest of society, the air
is overused as a disposal medium.
"Positive" externalities, the analog to negative externalities,
arise when the marginal social benefit (MSB) of some activity exceeds
the marginal private benefit (MPB) (see Figure 2-2).

In this case,

private output is less (Qp) than under efficient resource allocation
(Q*). Again, the greater the difference between social and private
benefits, the greater the misallocation.

Scenic vistas provide an

example of a positive externality. A private owner may find it diffi
cult to capture the value of a scenic view and, hence, may produce
less of these views than would be socially optimal. For the natural
environments examined in this paper, the concept of positive externalities
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is a particularly useful scheme.

Many other goods— parks, wildlife

habitat, and so forth— have often been considered positive externalities.

Public Goods
Public goods are more extreme cases of the positive externality
problem and have provided a strong argument for government allocation
of natural environments.

Samuelson first described "public goods" in

economic terms in 1954.2 His original definition described public
goods as distinguished (from private goods) by nonexcludability and
jointness in consumption. Public goods can also be distinguished from
private goods by their vertically summed demand curves (private good
demand is summed horizontally), which illustrates jointness of con
sumption.^ To be more specific, a public good is one for which users
cannot be excluded and the marginal cost of use approaches zero.
Because of these characteristics, there exists no incentive for any
individual or firm to produce such a good.

National defense is perhaps

the classic example of a public good, but many natural areas are
considered to have public good characteristics— national parks,
wilderness areas, and wildlife refuges, for example.

By definition, a

pure public good must be provided by government in order for efficient
allocation, or any allocation for that matter.

Public goods can also

be described as the extreme case of positive externality— the divergence
between private and social benefits is maximized; in effect there are
no private benefits to be realized from the production of a pure
public good.

Natural resource economists have applied the public good model to
many of the natural environments examined in this paper. Krutilla,
for example, argued that a good might also be considered public be
cause of indivisibility, irreversibility, and various nonmarket de
mands.4 She concept of indivisibility suggests that certain goods
must remain intact for them to maintain their value; that is, the
Grand Canyon would not have the same value if only half of it were
preserved.

Because of indivisibility, it is difficult for a private

owner to own such a "large" resource.

Hie irreversibility argument

suggests that the nature of some resources is such that any develop
ment would destroy the resource for all time.

Once Old Faithful has

been developed for geothermal energy, its ecological and aesthetic
value would likely be destroyed. Regarding nonmarket demands, econo
mists have argued that many people value natural areas such as wilder
ness simply because they exist (existence demand), because they would
v

like to have the option of visiting a wilderness (option demand), and
because they would like to pass on wilderness to their children (be
quest demand).5 It is difficult for a private owner to capture these
values with a market price for entry.
Because of the public good characteristics mentioned above, pri
vate individuals will often behave as "free riders" and avoid re
vealing their true willingness to pay for such goods.

Accordingly,

private individuals and firms have no incentive to produce these
goods.

Since these goods are wealth-creating, in the sense that they

provide utility for individuals, government production of these goods
is justified by economic theory.

The protection of natural environ
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ments, such as scenic areas and wildlife habitat, is considered to be
a public good by most contemporary natural resource economists.6 As
such, the public good-positive externality model is useful for an
alyzing the role of institutions in protecting natural environments.

Common Property
The third economic concept relevant to the protection of natural
areas is the problem of common property.

Common property (or a common

pool resource) is simply a resource for which there exists no exclu
sive property rights to use or allocation.

With respect to this

paper, such natural environments as ocean fisheries, wildlife habitat
(especially for migratory species), and watersheds are examples of
common property.

Common property provides the institutional setting

for resource overexploitation as individuals seek to maximize their
own welfare by utilizing the resource. Essentially it is the nature
of these resources that often hinders the establishment of property
rights. In addition, many publicly owned resources have attributes
that may be considered to be common property? backcountry recreation
in many of our wilderness areas is a good example.
Perhaps the most elegant treatment of the misallocations that
result from common property institutions was "The Tragedy of the
Commons" by ecologist Garrett Hardin in 1968.7 Hardin pointed out that
in a system where no one has exclusive rights to use a resource the
resource itself will be ultimately destroyed as individuals seek to
maximize their own gain.

Formal economic analysis of common proO

perty, however, has been advanced by the work of Gordon and Cheung.
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Gordon was one of the first to note that common property resources
yield no economic rent; that is, no returns exceeding opportunity
costs.

Cheung later elaborated the mechanism by which these rents

from "nonexclusive" (common property) resources are dissipated and how
private contracting may arise to curb the dissipation of these rents.
As has been pointed out by those who have contributed to the
economics literature regarding common property, wealth maximizing
individuals tend to overuse resources held in common. This predict
able result has been documented for many different resources.9 Be
cause common property leads to losses in social welfare, the institu
tion itself has serious shortcomings. Government regulation of common
property and the establishment of private property rights are two ways
of modifying the insitution such that private and social costs align
more closely.10
Understanding the institution of common property is important for
an analysis of the institutions that are used to protect natural
environments.

Wildlife (and wildlife habitat) represent the aspect of

natural area protection most closely fitting the common property
model, although neither is common property in the pure sense. Since
1842, court decisions in the United States have ruled that wild ani
mals are public property belonging to people of individual states as
well as the nation.11
When examining natural environments from a common property view
point, the appropriate questions are:

(1) when did—-if they did—

private property rights to the resource arise and in what form, and
(2) when did— if it did— government establish rights to the resource
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and how does it govern use and allocation of the resource.

In many

cases, wildlife and rangeland, for example/ the government established
rights to use and allocation of a commmon property resource in order
to prevent overuse.

In this paper, the appropriate use of the common

property model is the analysis of the establishment of rights (both
public and private) to the resource and how those rights influence
resource allocation. Little attention will be paid to existing common
property institutions (such as groundwater basins) as they have little
relevance for this paper. The common property problem regarding
natural environments is not one of continued "tragedies/" but one of
establishing rights systems that lead to efficient resource alloca
tion.

Economic analysis of common property shows that when the nature

of a resource prohibits the establishment of private rights/ govern
mental action is warranted in order to curb the overexploitation of
the resource.

"HeM Resource Economics";
The £ase £or Erivate Institutions
The traditional market failure analysis shown above indicates
that private institutions will have difficulty protecting the optimal
amount of natural environments because of public good-positive
externality and common property problems. Recently, however, there has
developed a new paradigm for natural resources economics that is
critical of traditional neoclassical market failure analysis and of
fers an explanation for some of the government inefficiencies
described in Chapter 1. The paradigm has been labeled the "New
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Resource Economics" by those scholars most closely involved with its
developing literature.1^

The New Resource Economics
The new resource economics has been termed "old ideas and new
applications" and is a blend of neoclassical, property rights, public
choice, and Austrian economics specifically applied to the problems of
natural resource management and allocation.1-* Neoclassical economics
is the paradigm most often taught in American universities today.
Anderson has identified the central elements of the neoclassical
paradigm as marginal analysis, information and uncertainty, and in
terest (capital) theory.14 Accordingly, the neoclassical microeconomic model illustrates the efficiency of a perfectly competitive
market. Because of its recognition that decisions are made on the
margin in an uncertain world where information is scarce, the neoclas
sical model provides important insights into natural resource alloca
tion. However, because the neoclassical model emphasizes market equi
librium and underestimates the importance of institutions, the model
often has difficulty in explaining real world decisions.
Property rights theory, a subset of neoclassical economics, de
veloped rapidly during the 1960s beginning with the publication of
classic articles by Coase and Demsetz.1^ Since that time, a paradigm
has developed that utilizes methodological individualism (as does
traditional neoclassical economics) and assumes that the individual
attempts to maximize his net welfare (not simply "profit") within the
existing institutional setting.

Property rights economics forces the
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analyst to examine the structure of property rights to resources in
order to determine the incentives faced by decision makers. Property
rights economists also acknowledge the importance of transaction
costs; because these costs are nearly always positive, they must be
considered when analyzing resource allocation. By linking ownership
rights, incentives, and economic behavior, the property rights para
digm expands the scope of economics beyond the competitive market
equilibrium emphasized by neoclassical theorists.
Public choice theory, also a subset of neoclassical economics, is
closely tied to the property rights paradigm.

Public choice econo

mists realize the importance of institutions and incentives in shaping
economic behavior, but they focus their analysis on decisions made
outside the market by voters, politicians, and bureaucrats.

Public

choice theory has spawned a vast body of literature that outlines the
economic logic of government resource allocation.^-6 Ihe theory of
public choice allows the economist to critically examine alternatives
to market allocation.
Austrian economics is, first of all, not a subset of neoclassical
theory.

The Austrian perspective developed concurrently with neoclas

sical theory during the late 1800s and is decidedly a different per
spective, though often underestimated and overlooked by contemporary
economists. Austrian economists stress the subjectivity of individu
ally held values and emphasize the market as a process that is able to
transmit knowledge concerning diverse and changing values through the
price system.^

To the Austrians, the market is best considered as an

information system. Austrians also stress entrepreneurship, the ten-
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dency of individuals motivated by profit to move resources to higher
valued uses.

The Austrian perspective also points to the inherent

difficulty of centralized economic planning because of the impossi
bility of obtaining correct information (without prices) and the lack
of socially efficient incentives.

Like public choice theory/ the

Austrian paradigm causes one to be critical of the government's abil
ity to efficiently allocate natural resources.
By utilizing the insights of these four perspectives/ the new
resource economics offers a more general theory of natural resource
allocation than does any single perspective.

The new resource eco

nomics allows one to examine the institutions through which resources
are distributed and make policy prescriptions based on that analysis.
The paradigm of the new resource economics stresses the fact that
there is no such thing as a perfect and costless economic system and
that sound policy attempts to establish the "least imperfect" system.
With regard to the protection of natural environments, the new
resource economics offers an explanation of the evidence presented in
Chapter 1, evidence that showed that private institutions are pro
tecting natural areas and evidence that public institutions are de
grading natural areas.

An analysis of "government failure" (the

market failure analog) will be used to outline the economic logic
behind the bureaucratic inefficiencies described in Chapter 1.

In

addition, a critical look at market failure analysis will be used to
explain why private institutions are actually protecting natural envi‘
ronments when conventional theory suggests that they do not have that
ability.
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Government Failure
The underlying logic behind government failure is the same as it
is for market failure: decision makers are not held responsible for
their actions.

Because government decision makers (politicians and

bureaucrats) do not hold property rights to the resources they allo
cate (i.e.,

they lack "residual claimancy"), they do not face strong

incentives to use resources efficiently.

In addition, bureaucrats and

politicians make decisions largely outside the market and do not
receive information in the form of prices. 'There are five specific
phenomena that explain why government agents tend to ignore the mar
ginal principle as a decision rule.18 These phenomena are:

(1)

rational ignorance, (2) the special interest effect, (3) the bundle
purchase effect, (4) the short-sightedness effect, and (5) little
incentive for internal efficiency.
First, voters in a democratic society tend to be "rationally
ignorant" of issues that do not immediately concern them.

The simple

fact that most Americans cannot even name their own Congressmen
vividly illustrates this point.19 On the other hand, the average
citizen is acutely aware of public policy directly influencing his own
well-being.

Farmers in North Dakota know (or care) little about

Montana wilderness policy but are keenly aware of the latest federal
farm bill. Likewise, Montana backpackers tend to have little interest
in farm policy but are quite knowledgeable about current policy con
cerning energy exploration in their favorite wilderness areas.

For

economists who recognize information as a scarce good, this rational
ignorance should come as no surprise.
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A second phenomena is the "special interest effect" and is exem
plified by the parable of the North Dakota farmer and the Montana
backpacker.

When an individual's vested interests are at stake, he

makes an effort to become informed and influence public policy.

When

issues become suffiently narrow (as do such issues as farm policy and
wilderness legislation) and when individual interests of a small group
become sufficiently large (as in farm and wilderness issues), "then a
narrowly focused but highly motivated special interest group is likely
to wield enormous political clout."^® When such a situation exists,
as it often does in representative government, the general taxpayer
contributes to the special interest kitty without being asked. From
the perspective of the special interest, the treasury is a common
property resource.
Third, because individuals place only one vote in the political
system for a representative who must speak for him on every issue,
there is an inherent lack of precision in political decision making.
Economists have labeled this the "bundle purchase effect." Even the
well-informed voter has little hope of expressing all of his prefer
ences in a political setting; in direct contrast is a market setting
where a "voter" (buyer) can express his preference specifically on a
multitude of "issues."
Fourth, since politicians and bureaucrats must provide satisfac
tion to current constituents, they suffer from a "short-sightedness
effect." Politicians are concerned primarily with pleasing current
voters, and bureaucrats are often concerned primarily with appeasing
current special interest groups.

Future generations are rarely given
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genuine consideration in political-bureaucratic decisions.

There is

no a priori reason to expect that decisions made in the public sector
will adequately consider the welfare of future generations. Beyond
two, four, or six years, the discount rate of the politician is likely
to approach infinity.
Finally, there is "little incentive for internal efficiency" in
the public sector. Decision makers are not residual claimants; that
is, they can rarely gain personally from making efficient choices. In
short, they cannot capture any residual or profit that might result
from wise decisions.

Instead of maximizing utility by seeking pro

fits, bureaucrats seek such things as "salary, perquisites of the
office, public reputation, power, patronage, and (increased) output of
the bureau."22 Similarly, they lose little by choosing an inefficient
alternative. Politicians and bureaucrats are usually removed from the
information (prices) available in the marketplace.

Government re

source allocation can be expected to have significant problems in
attaining the social optimum for the same reason as the market system;in effect, "authority and responsibility" are separated under imper
fect property rights arrangements.
All of these points illustrate the imprecision of government
resource allocation.

Recognizing the imperfections that are inherent

to government decision making helps explain how bureaucratic manage
ment has resulted in inefficient resource use and degraded natural
environments (see Chapter 1).

Politicians and special interest groups

have incentive to support costly and inefficient public programs, the
average voter has incentive to remain ignorant of these programs, and
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the bureaucrat has no incentive to follow a marginal decision-making
rule based on economic valuation. A program such as chaining appeases
local ranching interests (who receive subsidized forage improvement)
and their congressmen (who have favors to handout to their consti
tuents) and remains obscure to most voters (who are "rationally ig
norant"). More important, the bureaucrats who manage the program have
no incentive to curtail it when the last acre chained begins to have
costs that outweigh benefits.

As Sowell has noted, ''Given categorical

mandates and the law of diminishing returns, it is virtually inevit
able that governmental agencies would eventually end up doing things
23

which seem irrational as isolated decisions."

Property Rights and Market Failure
While the preceding government failure analysis offers an ex
planation for public degradation of natural areas, the traditional
market failure analysis suggests that the private protection of na
tural areas (described in Chapter 1) should not occur.

By utilizing

the property rights paradigm within the new resource economics, one
can critically examine the nature and extent of the public goodpositive externality and common property problems.

It should be

remembered that these two aspects of market failure are important for
analyzing the private protection of natural environments.
Natural environments 'are often considered to be a prime example
of public goods-positive externalities.

While the positive exter

nality model is useful in illustrating problems of inefficiency, it
does little to address the root cause of the inefficiency.

By util-
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izing the property rights paradigm, the divergence between private and
social benefits can be seen as an absence of efficient property
rights. A private owner who is unable to have exclusive and trans
ferable rights to a scenic view is unlikely to provide such a view for
social consumption.
Another analysis of externality has been put forth by Cheung who
has argued that "externality" is a misleading term and that the real
issue is transaction costs and uncontracted activities.24 Where the
costs of transacting a contract between parties are greater than the
benefits to be gained from the trade, a misallocation will occur. In
the case of scenic vistas, it may be prohibitively costly for the
owner to collect a fee from the passersby. Externalities, according to
Cheung, are more appropriately seen as uncontracted effects, whether
those affects are air pollution or scenic vistas.

In the same vein,

it is difficut to facilitate mutually beneficial contracts when pro
perty rights are lacking.
The property rights-transaction costs analysis of externality
points to different policy (both goals and tools) than does welfare
economics in the Pigovian tradition, which has suggested that an
appropriate goal is the elimination of externalities (internalization
of all costs and benefits) via a govemmentally imposed system of
taxes (to reduce negative spillovers) and subsidies (to stimulate
production of positive spillovers).

Coase and Cheung are but two

economists who have attacked this approach.2** Essentially, they have
argued that a more socially optimal policy would seek not to eliminate
externality, but to minimize transaction costs that impede voluntary

47

trade.

The analyses by Coase and Cheung recognized the fact that

"externalities" result from all activities apd that a policy that
seeks to eliminate an externality may in fact impose costs that exceed
the benefits of the intervention.26
An increasing number of economists have been criticizing the
traditional application of the theory of public goods-positive ex
ternalities.

Coase* for example, described the system of private

lighthouses in Great Britain and suggested that the lighthouse is not
as complete an example of a public good as Mill, Sidwick, Pigou,
Samuelson, and other economists have

argued. 2^

Likewise, Cheung has

described the elaborate system of contracting that has evolved between
beekeepers and apple growers in the state of Washington. Cheung ex
plained how private contracting has internalized the supposedly perva
sive externalities associated with bee pollination services and apple
blossom nectar services.2® Others have argued that when exclusion
becomes more feasible private pricing schemes will develop to provide
public goods without coercive action; in fact, some have argued that
very few goods meet the nonexcludability characteristic originally
described by Samuelson.29
The property rights examination of public goods-postive ex
ternalities suggest that certain natural environments may have fewer
public good characteristics than most natural resource economists
assume.

The degree of excludability is crucial to the private produc

tion of public goods, and the evidence presented in Chapter 1 suggests
that excludability is feasible in many instances.

The public good

problems that appear to be the most important for the protection of

48

natural environments are "irreversibility" and various nonmarket de
mands (i.e., bequest, existence, and option demand).

Irreversibility

is most important for unique resources, such as biological species,
and less important for such things as wildlife habitat. By the same
token it should be recognized that resource development can often
proceed without harming irreplacable natural areas.3® The "free
rider" problems of the nonmarket demands mentioned above are fre
quently and at least partially overcome by voluntary donations to
private conservation organizations who use their resources to protect
natural environments.
When natural environments exist as common property, they are
likely to be overexploited and, hence, degraded.

Regarding natural

environments, the problem of common property is not so much one of
overexploitation, but one of establishing the correct set of property
rights to use and allocation that will optimally allocate the resource.
Government regulation has been a typical response to common property
problems; the case of the Western rangeland is an example.

In many

cases, government control of a resource has actually legitimized the
institutional problems of common property and in the process caused
natural environments to be degraded.3^ These government responses
were implicitly based on the assumption that private institutions were
incapable of efficient allocation; but as Demsetz and others have
noted, private property rights to common property resources tend to
evolve as the value of the resource becomes conmmensurate with the
costs of defining and enforcing those rights.33 While the evolution
of property rights is a subject that will be explored in the following
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chapter# it should be recognized that the mere existence of common
property does not necessarily mean that private use will lead to
overexploitation.

Summary
From the perspective of the new resource economics, the problem
of market failure is best explained by the absence of well-defined,
enforced and transferable property rights to the specific resource in
question. Where such property rights are lacking, private institutions
have difficulty allocating resources efficiently.

The protection of

natural environments has generally been treated by economists as an
area where government action must be used to correct market failure.
However, there is substantial evidence that suggests that the problem
of market failure in protecting natural areas is less pervasive than
is often assumed.

In addition, the government failure analysis provided

by the new resource economics helps explain why public institutions
have often caused the degradation of natural areas.

In the next

chapter, I will examine the economic forces that explain the private
protection of natural environments. Such an examination is a requi
site for determining how one might further encourage the protection of
natural areas.

50

NOTES
1. Armen Alchian and William Allen# University Economics. 2nd
ed. (Belmont# California: Wadsworth, 1969), pp. 472-477; James D.
Guartney and Richard Stroup, Economics: Private sod Public £h&i££,
3rd ed. (New York, New York: Academic Press, 1983), pp. 610-614; and
Jack Hirschleifer, Price Uaeoiy and Applications, 2nd ed. (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1980), pp. 532-539.
2. Paul A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure,"
H3£ Review
Economics and Statistics 36 (November 1954): 387-389.
3. Idem, "Diagrammatic Exposition of a Pure Public Good," The
Review s£ Economics and Statistics 37 (November 1955): 350-356. See also
Joseph J. Seneca and Michael K. Taussig, fimgpnmental Economics, 2nd
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp. 91-112.
4. John V. Krutilla, "Conservation Reconsidered," American Eco
nomic Review 57 (September 1967): 777-786. Krutilla's argument fo
cused on a treatment of cases when natural environments exhibit
qualities of a public good.
5.

Ibid.

6. See, for example, Seneca and Taussig, Environmental Eco
nomics. pp. 91-112, 197-204.
7. Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons," Science 16
(December 13, 1968): 1243-1248.
8. Steven N.S. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the
Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource," Journal of Law and Economics 13
(April 1970): 49-70; and H. Scott Gordon, "The Economic Theory of a
Common Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal Of Political Economy
62 (April 1954): 124-142.
9. See generally Garrett Hardin and John Baden eds.. Managing
the Commons (San Francisco, California: W.H. Freeman 1977).
10. Common property institutions may avoid the "tragedy of the
commons" in some small group settings where social pressure is ex
tremely strong; families and certain communes are examples of effi
cient use of common property. See Kari Bullock and John Baden, "Com
munes and the Logic of the Commons," in Hardin and Baden, Managing the
Commons, pp. 182-199.
11. Ihfi Evolution gf National Wildlife I&U. See pp. 8-12 for
the legal-historical background regarding wildlife ownership rights.
English law had long recognized the right to take wildlife that was
owned by no one in nature. See pp. 12-20 for a description of the
development of the state ownership doctrine. In Martin y* Waddell.
1842, a landowner "claimed to own both the riparian and submerged

51

lands" of the Raritan River (New Jersey) and was attempting to exclude
all others from the oyster fishery with that claim. In this case, the
Supreme Court held that the navigable water (and the fishery) were
owned by the state as a public trust. Later in McCready
Virginia.
1876, the Court openly declared that the state owned the fish in the
navigable tidewaters. Finally, in Geer v.Connecticut. 1896, the
Court fully articulated the general theory of state ownership of
wildlife, stating that the state had the "right to control and regu
late the common property in game." From that point on, state regula
tion of wildlife and its taking had its foundation in American law.
12. Much of the literature relating to the "New Resource Eco
nomics" is attributed to those individuals associated with the Center
for Political Economy and Natural Resources at Montana State Univer
sity, Bozeman, Montana. These individuals include Terry Anderson,
John Baden, Ronald Johnson, and Richard Stroup.
13. Terry L. Anderson, "The New Resource Economics: Old Ideas
and New Applications," American Journal q£ Agricultural Economics 64
(December 1982): 928-934.
14. Ibid, p. 928.
15. Ronald Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal nf Is m
and Economics 3 (October 1960): 1-44; and Harold Demsetz, "Toward a
Theory of Property Rights," American Economic Beview 57 (May 1967):
347-359.
16. See James M. Buchannan and Gordon Tullock, Has Calculus
Consent (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1962);
William Niskanen Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chi
cago, Illinois: Aldine-Atherton, 1971); and Mancur Olson, The Logic
of Collective Action (New York, New York: Schocken Books, 1965).
17. See F.A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American
Economic Review 35 (September 1945): 519-530; and Israel M. Kirzner,
Competition and Entrepreneurship (Chicago, Illinois: University of
Chicago Press, 1971).
18. Richard Stroup and John Baden, "Property Rights and Natural
Resource Management," Literature jof Liberty (October/December 1979),
pp. 5-44.
19. One poll taken in 1973 showed that 54 percent of the total
population did not know or failed to identify their own congressmen
correctly. See Louis Harris Poll, conducted for the U.S. Senate,
Committee on Governmental Operations. Published as Confidence and
Concern: Citizens View American Government JEart 21 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 215-216.
20. Stroup and Baden, "Property Rights and Natural Resource
Management," p. 15.

52

21. Rodney D. Fort and John Baden, "The Federal Treasury as a
Common Pool Resource and the Development of a Predatory Bureaucracy/"
in Baden and Stroup, Bureaucracy ss*. Environment, pp. 9-21.
22.

Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government, P> 38.

23. Thomas Sowell, Knowledge and Decision^ (New York, New York:
Basic Books, 1980), p. 141.
24. Cheung, "The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a
Non-Exclusive Resource." See also Carl J. Dahlman, "The Problem of
Externality." Journal
Law and Economics 22 (April 1979): 141-162.
25. Steven N.S. Cheung, The Myth
Social Cost (London,
England: The Institute for Economic Affairs, 1978); and Coase, "The
Problem of Social Cost."
26. John Burton has described Pigovian externality analysis in
the following manner:
The Pigovion social cost argument, carried to its logical
conclusion, can be deployed as an argument for government
intervention in anything and everything. For uncontracted
or external effects are a pervasive phenomenon ofsocial
life. Walk down any street and you will beconfronted with
a vast number of extenal effects:
- the pleasing sight of a well-kept garden,
- the noise of children playing,
- exhaust fumes from passing cars,
- the smell of cooking,
- a pretty girl passing by,
- the roar of the traffic,
- canine deposits underfoot,
- the jostle of the crowd,
-advertisements of billboards (sometimes garish, sometimes
informative and useful),
- and so on.
The simple Pigovian policy formula, carried to the
logical extreme, implies that government should intervene,
every second of our lives, to correct the myriad external
ities that surround us all the time.

53

This implication does not accord too well with common
sense. If governments intervened to correct every exter
nality, the entirety of the national effort would be eaten
up many times over by resource-consuming interventon— and
there would be no market activities left for "correction!"
The old grey mare of the economy would collapse under the
weight. Common sense suggests there is something funda
mentally wrong with the simple Pigovian policy formula.
See "Externalities, Property Rights, and Public Policy: Private Pro
perty Rights or the Spoliation of Nature," in Cheung, The Myth pf
Social Cost, pp. 69-91.
27. R.H. Coase, "The Lighthouse in Economics," Journal pf Law
and Economics 17 (October 1974): 357-376.
28. Steven N.S. Cheung, "The Fable of the Bees: An Economic
Investigation," Journal p£ Law and Economics 16 (April 1973): 11-34.
29. Harold Demsetz, "The Private Production of Public Goods,"
Journal pf Law and Economics 13 (October 1970): 293-306; and Dwight
R. Lee, "Discrimination and Efficiency in the Pricing of Public
Goods," Journal fif Law and Economics 20 (October 1977): 403-420. See
also Gwartney and Stroup, Economics, pp. 622-625, who have stated that
many so-called public goods that are not characterized fully by non
excludability, and hence often produced by private owners, are
more properly called "near-public goods." Example of goods charac
terized by concurrent consumption but not by non-excludability include
television broadcasts, movies, parks, and football games.
30. For example, the National Audubon Society has allowed
grazing, trapping, and natural gas development on its Paul J. Rainey
Wildlife Preserve without diminishing wildlife and aesthetic values.
See Donald G. Schueller, "Land of Snow Geese, Three-Cornered Grass—
and Lonnie Lege," Audubon (July 1978), pp. 18-37; and John G.
Mitchell, "The Trapping Question: Soft Skins and Sprung Steel,"
AudubCI! (July 1982), p. 81.
31.

Libecap, Locking Up Lhe Bangs.

32. Feral horses and burros, firewood in national forests,
national parks, Western rangeland, and statutory wilderness areas are
all examples where regulation has retained certain common property
characteristics. Most of this occurs because the resource is priced
at or near zero. In those cases, overexploitation of the resource
continues.
33. Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," See also
Terry L. Anderson and Peter J. Hill, "The Evolution of Property
Rights: A Study of the America West," Journal p£ Law 2nd Economics 12
(April 1975): 163-179.

CHAPTER 3

THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATELY PROTECTED
NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS
At this point, it should be clear that private institutions are
L,

capable (both in theory and in fact) of protecting natural environ
ments. An inquiry into the economic logic behind this protection is
the purpose of this chapter.

I will begin by reviewing demand and

supply components for the protection of natural areas. An examination
of the structure and evolution of property rights to natural areas
will follow. Prior to the chapter summary/ I will briefly examine such
considerations as de facto protection, as well as the economics of
nonprofit firms and philanthropists.

Demand and Supply Determinants
In order to carefully examine the economic components of private
protection, it is useful to begin by looking at the demand and supply
determinants for the protection of natural environments.

Such an

examination will provide a framework for analyzing market allocation
of these areas by private individuals and firms.

I will make no

attempt to specifically quantify such things as demand for waterfowl
habitat or the supply of scenic vistas.

I will, however, suggest that

the demand for and supply of natural areas has changed during the
course of America's history and that the general direction of that
change can be observed and defined. In that vein, I will be taking
a look at how the major demand and supply determinants have changed
over the past 200 years.
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Demand
In economics, the law of demand states that "there will be a
negative relationship between the price of a good and the amount of it
buyers are willing to purchase."1 Price theorists in general have
pointed to the following seven characteristics as those that determine
the quantity of a good or service demanded at a given price:

(1)

consumer income (wealth), (2) income distribution, (3) consumer pre
ferences (tastes), (4) number of consumers (population), (5) price of
related goods (both substitutes and compliments), (6) price expecta
tions, and (7) the structure of property rights (i.e.,

the extent of

exclusivity and transferability).2 Changes in any of these components
will necessitate, ceteris paribus, a "shift" in demand. The following
paragraphs examine the trends in these components as they relate to
the demand for natural environments.
Environmental goods, including natural areas, are often said to
be highly income elastic. In the words of Seneca and Taussig, authors
of a leading text on environmental economics, "we hypothesize that
environmental quality is a highly income elastic or luxury good, which
means that households with relatively high incomes desire to consume a
higher fraction of their income in the form of expenditures on envi' ronmental quality than do households with relatively low incomes."3
Intuitively, this hypothesis seems quite plausible, and the limited
available data are supportive. For example, studies have shown that
users of national parks and wilderness areas have incomes signifi
cantly above average.^
Assuming, then, that natural environments are luxury goods,
changes in per capita income are likely to have a significant impact

on demand.

North, Anderson, and Hill report that per capita income in

the United States has grown at an annual rate of 1.6 percent in real
terms since 1840.^ This represents a doubling every 43 years? in
other words, the average U.S. citizen in 1983 is approximately 3 1/2
times wealthier than his 1840 counterpart in terms of real income.
This evidence points to a significant increase in demand for natural
areas since the 19th century when conservation policy was developing.
Regarding the distribution of income. North, Anderson, and Hill point
out that income distribution has changed relatively little during
America's history.** In addition, there is little, if any, evidence
detailing the impact of differing wealth distribution on the demand
for natural areas.
Population, or numbers of consumers, obviously influences aggre
gate demand.

Since 1790 when the U.S. population was 3,929,214 to

1970 when population was 203,235,298, population increased by over 50
times (see Table 3-1).

It logically follows that this extremely large

increase in the number of potential consumers has caused an increase
in demand.

Although one could argue that preferences have changed

such that individuals value natural environments relatively higher
than they have in the past, I will not take the time to do so. Suf
fice it to say that demand for natural environments today is likely to
be higher than any time in the recent past due to significant in
creases in population and per capita income, as well as possible
Changes in the preferences of society's individuals.
Since little work, either theoretical or empirical, has been done
to examine the impact of related good prices or price expectations on
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Table 3-1

U.S. Population and Population Density, 1790-1970

Year

Population

Density
(population per square
mile of area)

1970
1960
1950
1940
1930
1920
1910
1900
1890
1880
1870
1860
1850
1840
1830
1820
1810
1800
1790

203,235,298
179,323,175
150,697,361
131,669,275
122,775,046
105,710,620
91,972,266
75,994,575
62,947,714
50,155,783
39,818,449
31,443,321
23,191,876
17,069,453
12,866,020
9,638,453
7,239,881
5,308,483
3,929,214

57.5
50.6
50.7
44.2
41.2
35.6
31.0
25.6
21.2
16.9
13.4
10.6
7.9
9.8
7.4
5.5
4.3
6.1
4.5

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Historical
Statistics OL the united States: Colonial Times to 1970., Part I
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 8.
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the demand for natural areas, little will be said here.

It is likely,

however, that there exist few close substitutes for wildlife, scenic
amenities, or ecological stability, lhat fact would also suggest that
demand is quite price inelastic; the fewer available substitutes the
more inelastic is demand.

Consumption data on complementary goods

like backpacks, rifles, cross-country skis, binoculars, cameras, and
Gore-tex clothing could potentially provide valuable information on
demand for. natural areas, but sound data and application are lacking.
One complementary good for which demand impact is descernable is
transportation. Lower transportation costs over time have undoubtedly
increased the demand for natural areas.
Price expectations typically influence demand in the following
manner:

if higher future prices are expected, demand will rise; if,

however, lower future prices are expected, demand will fall. At best,
it is unclear how price expectations have influenced demand for na
tural areas, especially considering the fact that many such areas are
provided at a zero price by government.

The role of property rights

in affecting demand is of crucial importance and will be more closely
analyzed later in this chapter.

It is important, however, to note

here that different property rights arrangements will yield different
pricing schemes that accordingly influence demand.®
Despite the absence of significant data, it seems to be reason
able to state that the demand for natural environments has grown
significantly during the course of American history.

Changes in

income, population, and preferences explain this demand shift best. A
lack of close substitutes also suggests that demand is quite price
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inelastic, especially for unique goods, such as the Grand Canyon.

One

might graphically display the changing demand over the last 200 years
as in Figure 3-1. Trend data for outdoor recreation supports the
contention that demand for natural areas has increased substantially
over the past two centuries.9
Figure 3-1
The Characteristics of the Demand
for Natural Environments, 1790-1980

VALUE

Dd 1980
Dd 1790

QUANTITY

60
Supply
Hie other major concept in economics is the law of supply, which
has been called "a principle which states that there will be a posi
tive relationship between the price of a good and the amount of it
offered for sale by sellers."10

In general, supply is determined by

the following six components:

(1) stock of the resource, (2) state of

technology, (3) input prices, (4) market access (entry), (5) information,
and (6) uncertainty.11 Any change in these components can facilitate
a "shift" in the supply schedule, which has been described as "a
change in the minimum price necessary to generate each different rate
of output."1^ Regarding natural environments, "supply" is taken
to mean the amount of goods and/or services that is available from
natural areas.

Quite obviously, the stock of natural areas is a

crucial variable in this supply function.

Technology, in turn, is an

important variable in determining the stock of natural areas. Hie
impacts of technological change on the stock of natural environments
is ambiguous; technological advancement has pushed the stock in both
directions.

Krutilla has argued that technology impacts natural

areas differently than other processed goods.11

While technological

advances can increase the stock of rugby balls (by reducing production
costs and using resources more efficiently), it is difficult to increase
the stock of Grand Canyons via technological advancement.

Krutilla

further stated that "the supply of natural phenomena is virtually
inelastic."1^ Accordingly, it would seem that technological improve
ments would make it "economical" to develop resources from pristine
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environs that were at one time of no value for production purposes,
thus further reducing the stock of natural phenomena.
Krutilla's supply inelasticity argument can be refined.

The

inelasticity is closely linked to the "irreversibility" of the resource
stock in question.

For unique biological-geological resources as Old

Faithful or the Grand Canyon, supply inelasticity is found; but for
waterfowl habitat on the northern prairie, the supply is more elastic.
Technology in wildland reclamation may ultimately be a determining
factor in the stock of natural areas; thus, influencing the supply of
goods and services provided from natural areas.^ Timberline Recla
mation, for example, is a company that reclaims streams in order to
enhance the productivity of the natural fishery (see Appendix C). The
technological advances made by Timberline Reclamation most certainly
have increased the stock of natural areas.

In essence, technology has

an important, but ambiguous and often counterbalancing impact on the
stock of natural environments. Generally, however, during the course
of American history, technological advances have often reduced the
stock of those areas.
Regarding the effect of input prices, market access, information,
and uncertainty on the supply of natural area goods and services,
little will be said here.

Since the allocation of these goods and

services is generally not a typical production process (in the sense
of adding labor and capital to natural resources), input prices are
largely irrelevant to the allocation question, except to the extent
that the costs of defining and enforcing property rights might be
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considered input prices. An examination of property rights will come
later in this chapter.
Market access is a crucial point that will also be examined
within the context of property rights arrangements.

For example,

the fact that wildlife have long been declared (by the courts) to be
public property has often hindered the ability of the private sector
to manage land for wildlife purposes.

Information and uncertainty are

also important supply determinants. The lack of accurate information
is a problem in all economic systems and the degree of inaccuracy will
influence output supply. With respect to goods and services from
natural environments, where price information is so often lacking, it
is quite plausible that supply is suboptimal.

Uncertainty about

future demand can also impact the supply; in fact much of the debate
over environmental preservation issues is implicitly a debate over the
future demand (value) of natural environments.
Because the forces of technology can shift supply in two direc
tions (by impacting resource stocks as well as the cost of providing
goods and services) and because it is difficult to pinpoint the specific
impacts of the other supply determinants, it is difficult to make
strong statements about the long-term trend regarding the supply of
goods and services from natural areas. While it is recognized that
there are fewer roadless areas in the U.S. today than in 1776 and that
certain species have become extinct during that same period, it is
difficult to determine the long-term supply trend for these goods and
services.

One might postulate that resource stock has declined for

most of U.S. history and has increased in recent years, however, there

63

does not appear to be any significant research (either theoretical or
empirical) to allow one to make a more substantive statement about the
changing supply of goods and services provided by natural environments.
The preceding demand and supply analysis, while by no means
conclusive, suggests that the price (value) of natural environments
has risen during the course of American history. This suggestion is
drawn from evidence pointing to a large increase in demand and a
likely decrease in supply (although supply may be increasing in recent
years) for these areas.

One of the difficulties of analyzing demand

and supply in greater detail is the difficulty of accurately categor
izing a particular resource as a "natural environment." Nevertheless,
the preceding section has illuminated at least some of the economic
forces surrounding the protection of natural environments.

The Structure and Evolution of Property Rights
While an examination of the private protection of natural areas
could utilize the concepts of externality, public goods, and common
property, a more complete and in-depth analysis is one that examines
the structure and evolution of property rights to these resources.1®
Positive externalities-public goods are cases where existing property
rights do not allow optimal price exclusion, and common property is a
case where property rights simply do not exist.

In these cases,

private institutions are easily shown to be inefficient.

Natural

environments are generally put into these broad, often ambiguous
categories.

In this section, I will outline the existing theory

regarding the evolution of property rights and the form in which they

64

evolve.

In addition, I will apply this theory to the allocation of

natural areas in an attempt to gain a better understanding of private
protection than is possible via the typical market failure analysis.

The Evolution of Property Rights
The economic literature dealing with the formation of property
rights from common property began with Demsetz's "Toward a Theory of
Property Rights."1"^ In his original thesis, Demsetz stated that
"property rights develop to internalize externalities when the gains
to internalization become larger than the cost of internalization."1®
Demsetz described the establishment of hunting territories by the
Montagnais Indians (who lived on the Labrador Peninsula) as the value
of the fur-bearing animals in the area increased.19
Anderson and Hill, however, were the first to explicitly define,
the variables important to the establishment of private property
rights.^® They used a simple model that compared the marginal bene
fits and costs of defining and enforcing property rights to explain
the equilibrium level of definition and enforcement activity. Ander
son and Hill's model also helped explain the changing structure of
property rights over time. The marginal benefit of defining and
enforcing rights is linked to resource scarcity, which is determined
to a great degree by physical scarcity and changing preferences.

As

will be shown later, the benefits of defining and enforcing rights to
wildlife and wildlife habitat have been increasing over time as
wildlife has become more valuable.
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The marginal cost of defining and enforcing rights is largely a
function of "technology, resource endowments, and scale of opera
tions," all of which change the quantity of resources or the oppor
tunity cost of production.21 As Anderson and Hill noted, the develop
ment of barbed wire fencing was a technological advance that drama
tically lowered the cost of defining and enforcing rights to the
grassland of the Great Plains.

Anderson and Hill applied their model

to the system of property right to land, livestock, and water in the
American West and found it to be a powerful tool for explaining the
evolution of rights to those resources out of a system of common
property.
(Jmbeck further expanded the theory of evolving property rights
and applied it to the California Gold Push.22

Following Cheung's

rent-dissipation model, Umbeck postulated that "there are potential
gains from (exclusion) . . . and establishing property rights" to a
common property resource.21 When these rights will be established
will depend on the value of the resource and the cost of negotiating
and enforcing the property rights. A fundamental addition to the
theory of evolving property rights is his assertion that "as the value
of a piece of property rises, the cost of enforcing the rights to that
will also rise," but that the value of a piece of property will rise
faster than the costs of negotiation and enforcement.2^ Accordingly,
there will be an optimal point at which the establishment of rights
makes economic sense.
limbeck's argument that enforcement costs will rise with property
value is certainly plausible in a static sense, but it ignores both
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the dynamics of technological change and the impact of government
policy.

In addition, Umbeck's model (as well as those of Anderson and

Hill and Demsetz) ignores the degree of transferability as a variable
in determining the net benefits of establishing property rights to a
nonexclusive resource. A more complete model building on Demsetz,
Anderson and Hill, and Umbeck is illustrated in Figure 3-2.
Assuming that the value of a resource rises over time and the
cost of defining, enforcing, and transferring private rights is con
stant over time, an individual would establish rights to a common
property resource at time T*. The costs of defining, enforcing, and
transferring rights are, in effect, the component costs of establishing
rights.

Exogenous forces that alter these costs ultimately alter the

optimal time for the establishment of private rights.
forces include technology and government activity.

These exogenous

Changing technol

ogy will generally reduce these costs and speed up the process of
rights establishment.

Technological advances, such as barbed wire,

hot metal branding, electrical meters, and pollution monitoring equip
ment, have all lowered the cost of defining, enforcing, and transfering rights.
Government activity, on the other hand, may either increase or
decrease these costs depending on the specific action taken.

At this

point, it is unclear which has been the dominant impact; it is clear,
however, that government policy has often influenced the evolution of
property rights.^ This observation is extremely important to the
allocation of natural environments.

Government activity in the form

of law, police protection, subsidization, tax exemption, and trade
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Figure 3-2

Optimal Time for Establishing Rights to Coiranon Property

Resource
Value

Cost of
Establishing
Property rights

TIME

restrictions can lower the costs of establishing private rights.

On

the other hand, government actions such as legal barriers to trade,
regulation, and taxation can increase the cost of establishing rights.
As suggested in Chapter 2, federal land disposal policy often
contained riders that significantly increased the cost of establishing
private property rights to land.27 Such restrictions also prolonged
the period of common property resource use; in this respect, ineffi
ciency was promoted. Public ownership, however, is the policy that

68

raises the cost of establishing private property rights the highest.
Federal land reservation and acquisition along with court rulings on
public wildlife ownership are two areas of public ownership important
for this paper.

In these cases# the cost of establishing property

rights is quite high# perhaps even infinitely high in some cases.
Along with the public ownership cost# other impacts are the indirect
costs seen in the form of zero-priced competition.

A partial reason#

at least# for the relative lack of large-scale private outdoor recrea
tion in Montana and Idaho is the fact that the federal government
provides an enormous supply of these goods at a zero (or nearly zero)
price.

Accordingly# taxation, regulation# and licensure can also

increase the costs of rights establishment.
While most of the literature has focused on the cost of defining
and enforcing rights# the cost of transferring those rights is also an
important variable in the establishment of property rights. The cost
of transferring rights is largely influenced by the legal framework of
a society.

For various reasons# many types of transfers are re

stricted or prohibited by law; as such# they are quite costly.

In our

society, certain transfers of property rights have been prohibited
because of ethical objections to the trade; drug trafficing# gambling#
prostitution# and slavery are common examples. Legal restrictions on
the transferability of property rights also has implications for the
protection of natural environments.

Ownership of instream surface

water has generally not been held to be "beneficial use" and# there
fore# has not been considered a legitimate property right.^® As such#
the cost of establishing instream rights are prohibitively high.
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Legal constraints on the transfer of groundwater rights have also
reduced efficient water use and led to environmental degradation.**
Case law has continually declared wildlife to be the property of the
state; accordingly, the cost of establishing rights to wildlife
on

resources is prohibitively high.

While such exogenous variables as technology and government ac
tivity have been shown to influence the optimal time of property
rights establishment, one endogenous variable— the nature of the re
source in question— is also important.

Stationary, tangible resources

like rangeland or even domestic cattle present relatively few problems
in defining and enforcing rights. Air and migratory wildlife, however,
have "fugitive" characteristics that in and of themselves increase the
costs of establishing property rights. Accordingly, one would expect
resources with such fugitive characteristics to remain as common
property for a longer period than other resources.
Research (by Dennen; and North, Anderson, and Hill) supports the
model depicted in Figure 3-2 and help explain the process of property
rights establishment to the American West that was briefly described
in Chapter 2.33 Dennen argued, consistant with the above theory, that
there exists an optimal time to bring land into agricultural produc
tion from an idle (natural) state.

Regarding public land disposal in

the 1800s, he stated the argument in the following ways

"There is

some optimal path of releasing land from the public domain and
bringing it into production which will maximize the value of output.
Releasing land more quickly will reduce output, as will releasing land
too slowly."32

Dennen concluded that the Land Act of 1785, which authorized the
sale of public land to the highest bidder (see Table 1-2), was the
land policy disposal policy that most closely approximated the optimal
solution. Consistant with the research by Johnson and Libecap (see
Chapter 2), Dennen noted how homesteading policies forced land into
production prior to the optimal time required to maximize value. These
restrictive policies forced early production by requiring production
in order to obtain legal patent to the land.

As supporting evidence,

Dennen cited both the high failure rate of prairie homesteads (which
indicates that land was put into production "too soon") and the
practice of idle land retention (for periods of up to 20 years) by
land speculators during the era of land auction sales.
The land-rent model articulated by North, Anderson, and Hill in
Growth fiind Welfare in the American Past elaborated Dennen's theory.33
In their model (reported as Figure 3-3), an economically rational
individual observing a parcel of land with rents rising over time (and
beginning as negative) would establish property rights as soon as the
net discounted present value (NDFV) of the land exceeded zero (some
time prior to t*). The rational owner would then put the land into
production at time t* in order to maximize NDFV. The observation of
land speculation by Dennen is perfectly consistent with this model.
Restrictive homesteading policies that required (among other things)
cultivation, irrigation, and construction in order to secure legal
patent (establish private property rights) forced land into production
prior to t , thus dissipating rents and wasting resources.
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Figure 3-3
Path of Land Rents Over Time
Source: Figure X.I; North, Anderson, and Hill, Growth and Welfare In
the American East* p. 117.

ANNUAL
RENT
FROM
LAND

t*

TIME

One can apply the Dennen and land-rent models to the protection
of natural environments.

Is it quite likely that rents to be captured

from producing or protecting wildlife habitat on the Western range
have been negative throughout most of U.S. history (just as were the
rents from wheat production op the Great Plains in 1865), and the
rational owner would be acting in a socially responsible manner not to
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produce these goods.

In 1983, however, many ranchers can capture

significant rents by protecting wildlife habitat and selling the right
to hunt and fish.35 Whether or not these production changes occurred
at t* is an empirical question not addressed here.

Efficient (wealth

maximizing) policy would seek to stimulate production at t*; the area
of environmental policy is no exception. Thus, the land-rent model
also provides a framework for examining production changes on land
where property rights already exist.

The Structure of Property Rights
Theory that attempts to explain the evolution of property rights
is of crucial importance but increases greatly in value when linked to
a theory of property rights structure.

Such a theory attempts to

postulate the form of ownership that will emerge from common property
under various circumstances and how those property rights will change
over time.
enforcement.
forms:

It also looks at the specificity of rights definition and
Demsetz originally identified three specific ownership

"communal ownership, private ownership, and state owner

ship."35 Demsetz described these ownership forms according to the
method of exclusion:

in communal ownership no state or person can

exclude others from use, in private ownership the owner may exclude
users,

and in state ownership the state may exclude users. Demsetz,

however, did not attempt to formulate a theory as to the conditions
fostering the different ownership patterns.
Following the literature concerning property rights evolution,
Yandle has offered a theory describing the evolution of property

rights through four explicit stages.3^ His four stages, which closely
follow rights regimes under Roman Law, are:

(1) common property, (2)

public property, (3) quasi-public property, and (4) private pro
perty.38

In this scheme, Yandle notes the historical tendency for

nation-states to establish rights to common property as overuse begins
to show its face. Yandle applied his model to air quality— a quasi
public property— and described the changing rights structure over
time.

Yandle's model and categories are useful but he makes little

attempt to specify the factor involved in altering property rights
arrangements.
Dennen and Umbeck have advanced theories regarding the structure
of property rights beyond the preliminaries offered by Demsetz and
Yandle.3^ Dennen examined property rights to rangeland in the Ameri
can West and suggested that three possible property rights regimes
exist:

(1) a regime in which exclusivity and intensity of use is

controlled, (2) a regime that controls only exclusivity, and (3) a
regime with no control (common property).

Prom Cheung's rent-dissipa-

tion theory, it follows that regime II will yield the highest rent and
regime 13 will ultimately dissipate all rents. Dennen's examination
of grazing rules imposed by cattlemen's associations during the latter
part of the 19th century supported the rent-dissipation model.

Den

nen's study also supported the implications of earlier property rights
theories by illustrating how property rights became more clearly
defined as resource value increased— regime 13 evolved into regime 12,
which evolved into regime II. As the gains from more explicit pro
perty rights definition become apparent, one would expect individuals
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to invest resources in that defintion; one expects the structure of
rights to change in the direction of more explicit definition and
enforcement.
Umbeck's study of property rights to California gold claims
stressed the importance of contracting costs (which are ultimately a
function of technology and the nature of the resource) in determining
how property rights evolve out of common property.
two potential types of regimes:

Umbeck described

(1) a "sharing contract" in which all

rents from a land parcel are shared but outsiders are excluded, and
(2) a "land allotment contract" in which outsiders are excluded and
each miner has a claim to all the rent from a clearly specified
portion of the parcel.4^ Sharing contracts will be chosen first when
income variance is high and enforcement costs (for the contract group)
are low because of the small number of individuals. As populations
grow, land allotment contracts become more economical because enforce
ment costs in sharing contracts rise quickly and the gains from
sharing decline as income variance declines (as population increases).
Umbeck's evidence from the California gold rush supported his theory:
the first contracts were all sharing, but as population increased land
allotment contracts came to dominate.
A later article by Umbeck in 1981 examined the initial structure
of property rights distribution by examining such variables as the
degree of land homogeneity and the relative difference in individuals'
abilities in violent force and productivity.41 Where individuals have
equal abilities to use violence (in order to obtain property rights)
and to be productive, a homogenous resource will always be divided
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evenly among the competing users.

When a resource is nonhomogenous,

it will be divided in parcel sizes inversely related to its produc
tivity.

In both cases, the initial wealth endowment is equally, not

randomly, distributed. ,The California gold rush provided a test tube
for Umbeck's theory because individual variation in abilities of
violence and mining productivity were negligible. The evidence was
supportive: rich gold lands were held in small parcels while large
claims were generally less productive. Umbeck's theory may have
something to say about the variance of size in agricultural operations
across the country, especially with regard to the optimal size of an
operation and its relationship to homesteading policies.

In this

regard, Umbeck's analysis is consistant with those who have suggested
that land disposal policy was often inefficient.
The rather small body of literature dealing with the structure of
emerging and changing property rights attempts to identify factors
that ultimately influence the existing property rights structure.
Beginning with common property, there are basically three paths to
take:

(1) the establishment of public ownership (only in the presence

of a coercive state), (2) the establishment of private property
rights, or (3) continued common property. Obviously, all three paths
have been taken. Where the state has been absent, as it was in the
California gold fields and on the cattle range of the Great Plains,
private rights have often emerged through voluntary contracts to
internalize the costs of continued common property.
Where the state has been present, policy has fostered both public and
private rights to common property resources. In cases such as the buffalo
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and the arid Western range, the state established ownership rights when
it was perceived that private ownership would be socially unproductive.
For such an irreversible resource as the bison (a fugitive resource on
the verge of extinction), the establishment of public ownership to a
common property resource would seem to be economically rational. When
resource irreplaceability is not a concern, state intervention in the
process of property rights evolution (to common property) may be
socially unproductive.^ There is evidence that under public owner
ship there exist few incentives for resource managers to significantly
reduce the problems of common property overexploitation.
It is well-known, for example, that recreational use on many of
the public lands is excessive and that optimally priced user fees
(which could restrict use and allocate the resource to those who value
it most) are rarely used.

Johnson has offered a partial explanation

for this by stating: "While one could argue that user fees may be
appropriate for recreational use, the FS (Forest Service) not sur
prisingly has shown little interest in fees. With negatively sloping
demand curves, user fees would reduce the number of visitations and
the political support recreationists give the FS."^

It is not clear,

given the current state of the theory and evidence, what kind of
policy is the most efficient method of handling the common property
problem. While it is often difficult for individuals to establish
property rights, it is also the case that government agents have
difficulty in efficiently allocating resources.
Beyond Yandle's brief postulating, little theory has been ad
vanced regarding the structure of public ownership that can emerge

from common property; research is needed in this area. Yandle# how
ever# has suggested that private ownership will ultimately emerge from
collective attempts at allocating common property. The work by Dennen
and Umbeck indicate that property rights regimes are dynamic and
change when exogenous forces make it economical to do so. In short#
one can expect increased and explicit property rights definition with
population increases# technological advances# and growing resource
values. The recent development of conservation easements and lease
arrangements to protect natural environments represents a detailed
segregation and specification of property rights, one that is made
possible by an increasing value for the resource (see Chapter 4#
Appendix B# and Appendix C).
Umbeck's later work suggested that the initial property rights
structure is influenced by the degree of resource homogeneity and by
individuals' comparative advantage in violence (the ability to enforce
rights) and productivity.

In summary# existing research has identified

resource value# technology# population# the degree of resource homo
geneity# and individuals' comparative advantages as partial determi
nants of property rights regimes. A theory that addresses the impact
of government activity on the structure and evolution of property
rights would be most useful; yet, outside of some of the literature on
rent-dissipating land policy# little is currently available.
Other Considerations
Thus far# I have examined the private protection of natural
environments from both a demand-supply perspective and a property
rights perspective. In this section# I will examine two other areas
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relevant to private protection of natural areas:

(1) de facto protec

tion of natural areas and (2) nonprofit institutions and philanthro
pists. Each of these areas has been an important factor in private
protection of natural environments, and any such analysis would be
incomplete without their inclusion. The literature in each of these
areas is quite scanty, and I will attempt here only to establish a
basic framework for looking at the empirical data (outlined in Chapter
1). The property rights framework will also be utilized in these dis
cussions.
De Facto Protection of Natural Environments
Perhaps one of the most overlooked mechanisms of protecting
natural areas is through de facto protection by private owners.

In

such a case, the costs of development may simply outweigh the gains or
there may be no conflict between resource development and natural area
protection.

Where this situation exists, the private profit-seeking

landowner finds it in his own interest to preserve land in its natural
state. To my knowledge, there exists no research documenting the
extent of such preservation; the fact that it exists is illustrated by
the lack of logging activities by Champion International in the Hellgate Canyon east of Missoula, Montana.44 Untouched wetlands on the
prairie of North Dakota provide another example of de facto preservation.
Recently there have been studies that suggest that federal agen
cies have developed significant areas of land that would be left in
pristine conditions given the incentives of private ownership (see
Chapter 1).

Hyde has studied timber management by the U.S. Forest

Service in the Pacific Northwest and southwestern Colorado and found

that timber harvest operations had been expanded into many areas where
sales, administration, and roading costs exceeded the value of the
timber.4-* In the Douglas-Fir region (Oregon and Washington west of
the Cascade crest), Hyde found that 3.2 million acres of public for
estland were allocated to timber, even though they were unprofitable
for timber production.

Hyde also found the Forest Service to be

expanding its timber program into over 400,000 acres of roadless area
in the San Juan National Forest (Colorado) despite the fact that
roading costs alone exceeded the stumpage value of the timber.
Studies by Barlow et al. have supported the work by Hyde. 4® They
found that "below cost timber sales" were common in many of our na
tional forests.

Chaining programs by the Bureau of Land Management

are another example of land development by public agenices that does
not cover its costs. Dams and canals built by the Bureau of Reclama
tion and the Army Corps of Engineers have often lacked economic justi
fication and have disturbed natural areas.

In short, there is a

growing body of evidence that indicates that the profit-motive applied
to our public lands would result in a significant amount of land
preservation by default.47 Perhaps because protection is not the over
riding goal in these cases, many people are uncomfortable with these
data.

In any case, it is evident that the profit motive can provide

strong incentives for protection simply by providing information con
cerning negative rents.
The existence of de facto protection of natural environments can
be explained via the property rights models described in the previous
section.

Following North, Anderson, and Hill's land-rent model
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(Figure 3-3), de facto protection will occur at all times prior to t*,
since production does not begin until that point.

Policies that have

encouraged production to begin prior to t* not only are inefficient
but also degrade environments that would otherwise be preserved for a
time.

Both the land-rent model and the optimal timing model (Figure

3-2) aid in the explanation of de facto protection that results from
taking land out of production or even abandoning developed (cultivated)
land.

In these cases the "resource value curve" (Figure 3-2) and the

"land-rent curve" (Figure 3-3) ultimately slope downward at some
point, making it uneconomical to continue production or perhaps even
to continue to define and enforce property rights.

Farmland that has

reverted back to rangeland or wetland constitutes an example of such
de facto protection.

Economies of Nonprofit Conservation Organizations
and Philanthropy
In the area of natural environment protection, nonprofit organi
zations have long played a major role in influencing policy and con
trolling resources.

Groups like the Sierra Club and the Audubon

Society were organized before 1900 and are familiar to most Americans.
Today, there are literally hundreds of private nonprofit conservation
groups with millions of members and operating budgets in the millions
of dollars (see Appendix B). These organizations own land for con
servation purposes, support scientific research and education, and
engage in political activism. They are certainly a major factor in
contemporary conservation issues.
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While it is obvious that nonprofit firms should behave differ
ently from profit-seeking firms (because of the different incentive
structures)/ economists have not spent a great deal of time examining
the behavior of nonprofit firms.

Alchian and Allen have defined

nonprofit firms as being characterized by "no group of trustees or
directors or 'owners' who can decide to distribute the net gains to
themselves as their own wealth, as can be done in a for-profit cor
poration.

Funds must be spent in the enterprise to further the pur/

pose of that enterprise."48 Because there is a lack of "residual
claimancy" in the nonprofit firm, one would expect lower internal
AQ

(within the firm) efficiency when compared to a profit-seeking firm.
Managers of nonprofit firms are consistently observed reducing effi

ciency by utilizing the firm's resources in ways that add to their own
nonpecuniary income.^8
Nonprofit firms are typically granted tax exemptions and other
legal privileges.

Newhouse has suggested that a hospital's nonprofit

status may be justified in an "ethical sense"; this might also be true
for conservation organizations, depending on one's values.This
nonprofit status can also be justified via the theory of public goods.
As was previously stated, there are certain aspects of natural envi
ronments that may lead to suboptimal production by profit-seeking
firms.

The nonmarket (existence, bequest, and option) demands noted

by Krutilla may be captured by nonprofit conservation organizations
more effectively than by profit-seekers.

Because nonprofit institu

tions have specific goals other than profit maximization, they are
able to garner funds from those who might otherwise be free riders.
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The Nature Conservancy, for example, is an example of a conserva
tion organization that is able to capture the existence, option, and
bequest demand for preserving natural areas.
Nonprofit conservation organizations may also increase efficiency
by reducing the transaction costs associated with protection-development trade-offs.

Many protection-development trade-offs are charac

terized by a significant asymmetry of transaction costs; development
interests are typically concentrated and well-defined, while preserva
tion interests are usually widely diffused over individuals and area.
Because of this cost asymmetry, different entitlements will yield
different resource allocations— nonprofit conservation organizations
that own land reduce the transaction costs of contracting for resource
development and, hence, improve the efficiency of resource allocation
for preservation purposes. For example, on public wilderness areas
where development potential exists, the bargaining typically takes the
following form:

one or two development companies square off against a

diffuse group of wilderness supporters. However, when conservation
groups own land they become a concentrated and well-defined interest
in the same manner as the oil company that might have an interest in
developing a portion of the land.52 As such, the costs of transacting
are much reduced when compared to the public case.
While nonprofit conservation organizations may improve the effi
ciency of public goods production by capturing nonmarket demands and
reducing the transaction costs of contracting, they may also lead to
internal inefficiency (like government agencies) because of the ab
sence of residual claimancy.

Little, if any, research has been done
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to examine the behavior of decision-makers within conservation organiza
tions; but unless these groups are over-endowed with selflessf public
spirited individuals, a certain amount of inefficiency must be ex
pected.

However, because private, nonprofit conservation organiza

tions depend on voluntary contributions and donations, there does
exist more incentive to be efficient than for government bureau
cracies. As Sowell has stated,

"The point is that a non-governmental

organization subject to feedback from donors or customers has incen
tives and constraints that lead to institutional decisions more at
tuned to rational social trade-offs."53. Because of this, one would
expect such organizations to be quite aware of opportunity costs of
alternative land allocation schemes; these incentives are likely to
foster innovative contractual responses to the problem of externality.
As will be shown in Chapter 4, this appears to be true in many cases
(see also Appendices B and C).
Closely tied to the economics of nonprofit organizations is the
role of philanthropy.

Philanthropy (or charity) is and has been

extremely important in natural area protection.

John D. Rockefeller

Jr., for example, was instrumental in establishing several national
parks, museums of natural history, and preserving other scenic areas
(see Appendix A).

In Maine, ex-governor Percival P. Baxter donated a

200,000-acre preserve containing Maine's tallest peak, Mt. Katahdin,
known today as Baxter State Park.54 Many other charitable gifts by
private individuals have aided the protection of natural environments,
although few are as spectacular as the contributions of Rockefeller
and Baxter (see Chapter 1 and Appendix A for more on this topic).
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Economists have examined philanthropic behavior even less than
they have examined the behavior of nonprofit firms.

Yet, the behavior

of philanthropists is well within the bounds of economic science.

As

Alchian and Allen noted, philanthropic behavior is quite consistent
with economic man if one assumes that individuals gain utility from
their giving.55 From that base, economic theory can tell us how
different rules might impact on the incentives to undertake charitable
activities.

For instance, tax laws that regard gifts of land to

nonprofit conservation groups as tax-deductible charitable donations
significantly increase the incentive for philanthropic behavior.

As

will be noted in Chapter 4, this fact has been extremely important to
the success of many conservation groups.
Although I have only briefly touched on the issues involving the
economics of philanthropy and nonprofit firms, it should be recognized
that they play an integral part in private sector conservation.

The

absence of serious analysis of these points by economists is trouble
some, given that nonprofit firms and philanthropists play such a large
role in natural resource economics.

A useful addition to the natural

resource economics literature would be research into this portion of
the private sector.

Summary
Before moving on to Chapter 4, where I will examine the record of
privately protected natural areas within the context of the economic theory
\

outlined here, it will be useful to summarize the major points of this
chapter.

First, the evidence suggests that during the course of American
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history, there has been a gradual outward shift in the demand for natural
environments. Regarding the supply of these goods, perhaps the most
important factor— technology— was shown to push the supply in both
directions, depending on the specific circumstances.

No attempt was made

to determine how the point of optimal allocation has changed over time.
As shown in Chapter 2, externality, public goods, and common
property form the economic framework for analyzing the inefficiencies
often associated with the private protection of natural areas. All
three of these problems may be examined as cases of ill-defined pro
perty rights arrangements.

Recent research in the public choice-

property rights tradition has suggested that the problems of exter
nality and public goods are often overstated by natural resource
economists. The ability of individuals to "internalize" externalities
through contracting and to produce public goods has only recently been
articulated in the economics literature.
The property rights literature has also shown the process by
which private rights to common property emerge and the form in which
they emerge.

Rights to natural areas do not appear to be an excep

tional case in this process and can often be produced by the private
sector if the demand exists. Government policy was shown to have an
important impact on the cost of establishing property rights to re
sources and the subsequent cost of transferring those rights.

Given

the fact that many natural environments are characterized by legiti
mate public goods qualities, any type of cost increasing policy acts
only to reduce net social welfare.

Both the legal precedents against

owning water for instream purposes and against private ownership of
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wildlife have significantly hindered the private protection of natural
areas.
Models by Dennen and by North, Anderson, and Hill have described
an optimal time path for putting idle land into production. These
models may also be applied to the efficient path of production changes
on a given parcel of land.

Today, there certainly exists more rents

to be captured from natural area protection than could be 200 years
ago. Through traditional market allocation along with de facto pre
servation and nonprofit-philanthropic conservation, there is reason to
believe that the private sector can be quite successful in protecting
natural environments.
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CHAPTER 4
TOE PRIVATE PROTECTION OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS:
MECHANISMS AND INSTITUTIONS
In the preceding chapters, I have critically examined the conven
tional view that state intervention is required to insure the protec
tion of natural environments.

In addition, several concepts in eco

nomic theory were described in relation to the problem of protecting
natural areas. In this chapter, I will examine the data shown in
Chapter 1 by first looking at the mechanisms of protecting natural
areas in the private sector.

In addition, I will apply the property

rights theory (described in Chapter 3) to the data shown in Chapter 1
and Appendices B and C. Finally, I will offer some alternative insti
tutional arrangements that might further enhance the ability of the
private sector to protect natural environments.

The Mechanisms £QL Private Protection q£ Natural Environments
The mechanisms available for the protection of natural environ
ments in the private sector are numerous.

As with any set of volun

tary contracts, they are characterized by diversity and flexibility.
In the following section, I will briefly describe five mechanisms and
give examples of each. During this examination, the importance of
different property rights arrangements will be emphasized.

Fee Simple Ownership Natural Resources
The most direct way for the private sector to protect natural
areas is through fee simple ownership of natural resources.

Most

often this takes the form of land ownership, but it may also include
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ownership of water or wildlife (when legal institutions allow it) The
protection of natural areas by private landowners may take place with
or without profit-seeking and with or without specific conservation
goals.

Nonprofit conservation organizations like The Nature Conservancy

may purchase land solely for preservation and scientific purposes.
Profit-seeking firms like the International Paper Corporation, the
Diamond-A Cattle Company, and the R-Ranch make a profit by managing
their lands for wildlife, aesthetics, and recreation.
entails protection of natural environments.

Such management

De facto protection is

also important in the private sector; perhaps most importantly in the
Eastern states where landowners provide the bulk of the region's
scenic areas, open space, and wildlife habitat because of the absence
of large tracts of public land.

Lease Arrangements
Leasing is also a method by which those in the private sector can
protect natural areas, generally at a lower cost than fee simple
purchase of the land.

Land leases for hunting have been used for

years and are especially common in areas where public lands are
scarce.^- Recently, H and H Hunting Unlimited leased over 200,000
acres in central Montana in order to provide quality hunting for
upland game birds and big game animals (see Appendix C). These lease
arrangements allow agricultural landowners to capture some of the
benefits of providing wildlife habitat.

Nonprofit organization have

also used leaseholds on property as a method of securing protection of
valuable natural areas.2 Essentially, leases represent a more speci
fic definition of property rights than does outright land ownership.
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Conservation Easements
Conservation easements are perhaps the most recent innovation by
non-profit conservation groups and are currently quite widely used.
Brenneman defined an easement "as a priviledge on the part of the
person entitled to it to make some use of the land subject to it in
derogation of the possessory rights of the owner of the land."4 He
further stated that "it is a property right# and its possessor is

;

entitled to protection of it against not only the owner of the pro
perty subject to it but against all others."5 In simple terms# an
easement is nothing more than a specific property right to land held
by a party other than the landowner.5

!

A conservation easement gives the conservation group a property,
right in land development# recreational use# or whatever is desired to
meet the goals of both the landowner and the group. Because such
easements are voluntary contracts between the landowner and the con
servation group, they may be tailored to fit each different land
parcel (see Appendix E for an example of an actual easement).

Each

easement is different and allows both the landowner and the conserva
tion group great flexibility in achieving their goals.
Since conservation easements are typically held to be a charit
able donation to a non-profit organization# the landowner may often
have significant tax incentives to grant an easement# particularly if
the land has high development potential.

In Montana# one group (the

Montana Land Reliance) has protected over 21,000 acres through con
servation easements (see Appendix B).

In another example of conserva

tion via easement# The Nature Conservancy has secured a complex ease

1
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ment agreement with a diverse group of landowners in order to protect
9 miles (4,240 acres) of the lower Blackfoot River in western
Montana.^

Restrictive Covenants
Covenants that limit land use alternatives may also be used to
protect natural environments.

They are utilized in both the profit-

seeking and non-profit sectors of the private economy.8 Unlike ease
ments, which essentially are interests in land held by a party other
than the owner, covenants are mutual agreements between two or more
parties for the performance of some action. Restrictive covenants for
the purpose of protecting natural environments restrict land use
options so that environmental quality is maintained or enhanced. In
recent years, entrepreneurs have been able to capture the benefits of
protecting natural areas by placing restrictive covenants on their
housing developments (see Appendix F for an example of a protective
covenant).

For example, developed property on the expansive Forbes

Trinchera Ranch in south central Colorado is subject to scrutiny by a
private environmental control committee.8 The use of covenants allows
landowners to avoid or minimize the free rider problem and benefit
from the protection of natural environments often thought of as posi
tive externalities-public goods.

Assistance to Government Agencies
The final way the private sector works to protect natural areas
is by assisting government agencies, particularly in the area of land

acquisition for wildlife habitat and scenic areas. Because government
agencies are often characterized by sluggish responses to public
demands or legislated mandates, non-profit conservation organizations
have played important roles in land acquistion for public use. Much
of Redwood National Park, for example, was acquired for the National
Park Service through the private efforts of the Save-the-Redwoods
League (see Appendix B).

When land that is valuable for such public

uses as wildlife refuges or parks is available for sale, government
agencies frequently are unable to obtain funding in time to make the
purchase.

Non-profit groups have a strong history of purchasing such

land with the intent of selling it or donating it to such agencies as
the Fish and Wildlife Service for recreation or wildlife management.
Some groups have also "loaned" funds to agencies that are attempting
to purchase land. For example, when private landholders within the
Boundary Waters Canoe Area (a wilderness area in Minnesota) sought to
sell their inholdings, the Izaak Walton League of America Endowment
purchased many of these parcels and later turned them over to the
Forest Service for wilderness management (see Appendix B).

In these

cases, public good aspects of natural area protection are met through
private transactions; in addition, these activities help minimize the
free rider problem.

Applying the Hew Resource Economics Paradigm
Although the data in Chapter 1 (and associated appendices) does
not lend itself to precise quantitative analysis, it is useful to
examine individual cases in reference to externality, public goods,
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and common property issues in natural resource economics.

As already

mentioned, market allocation of resources tends to be efficient when
property rights are well-defined, enforced, and transferable.

Thus,

as expected, the private sector has been most efficient in protecting
those natural environments for which property rights can be estab
lished at the lowest costs.

Since the Cross Ranch and the Interna

tional Paper Company were described in the most detail in Chapter 1, I
will begin with those examples. Then I will examine selected pieces
of data displayed in Appendices B and C with respect to entrepreneur
ship, the structure and evolution of property rights, law and property
rights, contracts and externalities, and awareness of opportunity
costs.
With regard to the Cross Ranch, the land sales contract drawn up
by The Nature Conservancy (see Appendix D) represents an attempt to
minimize external effects of potential land use schemes on areas
adjacent to the acreage most valuable for protection.

For example,

The Nature Conservancy reserved all mineral rights to the land for
sale and restricted land use to agriculture and grazing only.

In

addition, they reserved the right to approve any residential or com
mercial construction as well as the right to access and excavation of
any archeaological site that does not "unreasonably interfere with the
buyer's agricultural use of the property." These stipulations will
minimize any future externalities that might have arisen from such
activities as surface mining or housing development.

Essentially,

these stipulations within the sales contract provide an example of how
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private contracting can minimize externalities/ much in the same
manner as Cheung described beekeeper-orchard grower contracts.*®
Another interesting aspect of the Cross Ranch project is its
relationship to a corporate farming act on the books in North Dakota
since the 1930s.

This legislation prohibits ownership of agricultural

land by any nonfamilial corporations/ but it has not been vigorously
enforced to date.

Technically, however, all non-profit corporations

that own farmland, including churches, university alumni associations,
and The Nature Conservancy, are in violation of the law.

Because of

fears that family-owned farms might be endangered by corporate pur
chases, there are currently efforts being made to increase enforcement
of this law. If strictly enforced, this law would prohibit The Nature
Conservancy from owning the Cross Ranch preserve.
The law represents a cost-increasing variable as depicted by the
model found in Figure 3-2; the enforcement of the corporate farming
act would very definitely increase The Nature Conservancy’s cost of
establishing property rights to the Cross Ranch.

In short, the cost

of transacting a trade would increase because of limitations on rights
transferability. One way this cost might be seen (if the law is en
forced) is through transferal of the property to some individual or
family who agreed to manage the land as would The Nature Conservancy.
For future purchases, The Nature Conservancy might have to work
through private buyers who met the requirements of the law.

Such

activities, by raising the cost of establishing property rights, would
ultimately delay rights establishment (to nature preserves) at the
margin.
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As shown in Chapter 3, exogenous variables, such as government
policy, can significantly influence the cost of establishing property
rights to resources.

This ultimately influences resource allocation.

International Paper (IP), for example, has forest land parcels that lie
within many different state boundaries. Their management is deter
mined, in part, by the political and economic conditions found in each
state.

In Louisiana, for example, IP has invested little in wildlife

production primarily because there is no trespass law in that state.
While the local police juries of the parish -government system may
enforce trespass on the small holdings of familiar individuals, there
is no such enforcement of rights for large commercial landowners like
IP. Essentially, Louisiana law .makes the cost of establishing pro
perty rights to wildlife habitat so high that on IP's Louisiana land
it remains a common property resource open to exploitation by anyone.
There is simply no incentive for IP to invest in wildlife resources
when the institutional setting precludes them from capturing any
returns on their investment.
IP's holdings in the Pacific Northwest (Washington and Oregon)
represent another case where exogenous variables have increased the
cost of establishing property rights to wildlife and recreational
resources.

IP owns approximately 1/2 million acres in the Northwest,

but it has no wildlife-recreational management program for these
holdings. The explanation for this fits well into the model depicted
in Figure 3-2.

First, IP's land in this region is surrounded by vast

areas of federal land, most of which are open to public access at a
zero price for hunting, camping, and other outdoor recreation.-^
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Second, IP's land consists of parcels that were originally part of the
railroad grant system; these lands are characterized by checkerboard
(alternate sections were granted to railroads) ownership patterns.
Because of the zero-priced competition provided by public land
holdings and because IP's ownership rights to land are not contiguous,
the cost of establishing property rights is quite high.

As such,

there is less incentive for IP to invest in wildlife-recreation pro
duction on its Pacific Northwest forests than there is on its southern
and eastern lands.
IP's rather recent push toward investment in wildlife and recrea
tion production represents a shift in land use that can, in part, be
explained by Dennen's optimal-time-of-production model and by the
land-rent model (Figure 3-3) of North, Anderson, and Hill.

Both of

these models were described in Chapter 3. As resource values change,
it makes economic sense for the rational owner to change his in
vestment level as well as his production mix.

Just as there exists an

optimal time to establish property rights and bring land into agricul
tural production (in order to maximize rent), there exists an optimal
time to bring land into wildlife-recreation production.

Given the

general trends in demand for protecting natural areas (see Chapter 3),
IP's rather recent shift toward wildlife-recreation production is
consistent with both the Dennen model and the land-rent model.
There are several other cases of private protection of natural
areas, which illustrate the theory found in the previous chapters.
The theory of entrepreneurship is readily applied to profit-seeking
protectors of natural environments.

As Kirzner has noted, the role

102

of entrepreneurship in economic theory is often ignored; this is
equally true in natural resource economics.1^ Kirzner further sug
gested that the entrepreneurial element in economics is "that element
of alertness to possibly newly worthwhile goals and to possibly newly
available resources."

12

Many of the firms shown in Appendix C can be described in terms
of entrepreneurship— entrepreneurs responding to new demands or util
izing new combinations of resources. Timberline Reclamation# the firm
that provides stream reclamation services/ is an example as is Oregon
Aqua Foods/ the salmon ranching enterprise. Other examples include
the R-Ranch/ a wilderness ranch in northern California in which indi
viduals buy shares in the ranch; the many profitable wild game ranches
in Africa; and the emergence of nordic ski centers which provide
outdoor amenities as part of the package.

In each of these cases#

some entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs perceived a demand for a
new product or new means of production. And in each case# the entre
preneur reaped significant rents from his alertness.

The fact that

these entrepreneurs have been successful suggests that demand for
protected natural areas has increased over time.

The problem with the

theory of entrepreneurship— a problem that has often been recognized—
is that the theory lacks analytical rigor.

Currently# the theory is

somewhat abstract and all-encompassing; it appears to explain many
things, yet it is a difficult theory to test. Thus# while the role of
the entrepreneur is certainly crucial to the protection of natural
environments# it is a theory that must be referred to with caution.
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A theory more applicable to the data displayed in this chapter is
Dennen's optimal-time-of-production model and the land-rent model of
North/ Anderson/ and Hill.

Just as it was applied to International

Paper's production of wildlife-recreation goodsr it can be applied to
other cases where land use changes have occurred.

The 14/000-acre

Burnt Pines Plantation in Georgia was formerly a land of cotton
fields; today/ it is managed exclusively (and profitably) for the
production of wild game, including quail and white-tailed deer. The
R-Ranch wilderness ranch was a livestock ranch until the early 1970s;
today/ it is managed for outdoor recreation/ wildlife/ and amenities.
As resource values have changed/ rational owners seeking to maximize
rents put the land into the protection of natural areas so that rents
from amenity/ recreation, and wildlife production could be earned.

As

with agricultural production, there exists an optimal time to shift
land use toward the protection of natural areas.
Following the model depicted by Figure 3-2, the optimal time of
establishing property rights and beginning production depends on
exogenous cost variables as well as the resources' value over time.
The influence of a corporate farming act on the Cross Ranch is but one
example of government policy altering these optimal times. Laws that
restrict or prohibit transactions are also important cost-increasing
variables.

Current case law, which regards wildlife and instream

water rights as public property, has already been mentioned as leading
to instances where the cost of establishing property rights is infin
itely high. Such laws do little to promote efficiency and may in some
cases stifle innovation. For example, in 1969 Malcom Forbes purchased

104

168,000 acres of mountainous terrain along the crest of the Sangre de
Cristo Mountains in south central Colorado. His intent was to estab
lish a game preserve— the largest in the continental United States.
Because the wildlife on Forbes property were legally considered public
property, state wildlife officials required Forbes to drive off all
native game from his property, fence it, and restock it with its own
game. These requirements essentially raised the cost of establishing
rights to the wildlife significantly beyond the benefits Forbes per
ceived, and the game preserve was not established.-^
Oregon Aqua Foods, the Weyerhauser Company subsidiary that
ranches salmon on the west coast has also been significantly influ
enced by government policy.

In 1971, Oregon passed legislation that

allowed release and recapture of salmon; this legislation lowered the
cost of establishing rights to the salmon.-^ In the neighboring state
of Washington, however, salmon ranching is currently unlawful. The
cost of establishing rights to the salmon was also lowered by techno
logical improvements: new hatcheries were built and new releaserecapture facilities and transportation techniques were developed.
Because the salmon have a "homing" sense and will return to their
release site at maturity, Oregon Aqua Foods have de facto rights to .
all those salmon that survive the rigors of ocean life, which include
both natural phenomena and sport fishermen.
Salmon ranching illustrates an important point about "wildlife
ranching" that is frequently ignored.

Whenever individuals are able

to establish rights to wild species in order to "cultivate" them for
marketable products, they concurrently reduce the harvest pressure on
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the remaining wild population that frequently exist as a common pro
perty resource. Salmon ranchers not only supply salmon for the public
fishery, they make it less feasible for commercial fishermen to over
exploit the resource by out-competing them. This is also true for
alligator, duck, and turtle farming, as well as big game ranching.16
Laws that have prohibited the marketing and trading of commodities
from wild species have often had the predictable (from an economic
point of view) impact of devastating the species they were designed to
protect.

17

Another aspect of government policy that influences the cost of
establishing property rights and the optimal time of production is the
extensive federal land holdings in the West.

These lands often pro

vide goods from protected areas at zero or near zero prices, thus
reducing the incentive for private landowners to manage for wildlife,
recreation, or amenities.

It is not surprising that International

Paper, Boise Cascade Corporation, and St. Regis Paper have wildlife
management programs on their Eastern lands and no programs on their
Western lands (see Appendix C). Burlington Northern, which has timber
land only in the West, also has no intensive wildlife program. Lease
and fee hunting is quite well-established in the South and the East
where private land dominates; in the West, it exists on a relatively
small scale.
Taxes are also an important factor in determining how private
institutions will protect natural areas.

Non-profit conservation

groups receive tax-exempt status under section 501(C)(3) of the Inter
nal Revenue Service tax code.

This exemption significantly increases
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the potential for conservation groups to secure rights to natural
environments for preservation purposes.
As mentioned with respect to salmon ranching, technology is
another factor that influences property rights establishment.

Barbed

wire fencing, for example, dramatically lowered the cost of estab
lishing rights to the Great Plains and shortened the period of non
exclusivity. Innovative contractual arrangements can be examined as
innovations in technology.

Leases, for example, offer a way of estab

lishing rights to fugitive resources at a lower cost than fee simple
ownership.

H and H Hunting Unlimited leased over 200,000 acres of

central Montana rangeland for hunting from different owners.

Such a

lease is a technological advancement, which allows H and H to estab
lish hunting rights to contiguous acres of land that they do not own
(see Appendix C).

They are able to capture economies of scale in

management and policing.
The Diamond-A Cattle Company of New Mexico, a large landowner in
New Mexico and Texas, has recently purchased a recreation lease on a
ranch in Colorado, giving them the right to guide hunters, fishermen,
and sightseers on a piece of property they do not own.-*-® The use of
the lease significantly reduces the costs of acquiring property rights
to recreational land.

Conservation easements used by non-profit

organizations to preserve land also represent a cost-decreasing tech
nological change (see this chapter and Appendix B).

While new innova

tions in contracting are rarely, if ever, examined as a change in
technology this approach is useful in that it allows one to more
closely analyze the dynamics of evolving property rights.
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In closing this section, a few notes should be made. Although
the data displayed in Appendices B and C offer examples of privately
protected natural environments that follow the theory in Chapter 3,
caution should be observed when drawing conclusions from such data.
These examples do not provide a "test" of the theory and should not be
taken as conclusive evidence.

There are, however, a few modest con

clusions that can be drawn from the data in this chapter.

First, the

private sector can and does protect natural areas when property rights
are defined, enforced, and transferable.

Second, voluntary arrange

ments (contracts) in the private sector often allow innovative and
flexible responses to the problems of externality and nonexclusivity.
Third, government policies can both increase and decrease the incen
tives for the private protection of natural areas by altering the
costs of establishing and transferring property rights.

institutional Alternatives
While it is true that private protection of natural environments
is quite extensive, there is no attempt to state whether or not this
private protection is socially optimal. Assuming that it is likely to
be suboptimal (for reasons that include public good characteristics of
certain natural areas and government activity that reduces incentives
for private protection), it is appropriate to make a few suggestions
regarding institutional alterations that might encourage private pro
tection of natural areas.

The goals of these possible institutional

changes are fourfold; (1) reduction of transaction costs in order to
encourage the production and trade of valuable goods, (2) internaliza-
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tion of the costs and benefits of economic activity, (3) allowing
exclusive and transferable rights to valuable resources, and (4)
19

minimization of opportunities for rent-seeking in the public sector.

Below I offer several possible institutional changes that, in varying
degrees, attempt to foster these goals.
Perhaps the most straightforward alternative is the idea of
"privatizing" some or all of the publicly owned l a n d s . B i e ra
tionale for moving public lands toward private ownership is essen
tially twofold.

First, private ownership would minimize the bureau

cratic inefficiencies described in Chapter 1. Many of these efficien
cies have resulted in degraded natural environments (see Chapter 1).
(An additional and complementary alternative is the elimination of
costly government subsidy programs to natural resource developers,
some of which were described earlier in Chapter One.) Both priva
tization and the elimination of subsidies could result in an increase
in the protection of natural areas.

A second reason for privatization

is to increase the efficiency of natural resource utilization.
Economic theory has often shown the efficiency of the private sector
when property rights to resources are secure and transferable.
The argument for privatization is strongest for those lands
primarily valued for commodity production; that is, lands where the
rights to the resources in question are easily defined, enforced, and
transferee). Timber and range lands fit into this category, and pri
vatization of such land would likely result in increased efficiency of
production as well as limiting development to those areas where benefits
exceed costs.

Publicly owned lands valued primarily for wildlife, re-
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creation/ and natural amenities are generally thought to be less
suitable for private ownership because of the difficuly of estab
lishing exclusive rights to such resources.

However/ privatization

programs that utlilize such bools as (1) preemption clauses that
recognize the legitimate/ existing rights of public lands users/ (2)
compensation packages for those who suffer losses, and (3) publicly
held covenants (which restrict development) to certain scenic or
irreplaceable resources21 might be able to protect public values and
still have the benefits of private sector efficiency.
Another possible alternative is the removal of legal barriers to
ownership and transfer of certain natural resources. Wildlife and
water (both instream and underground) are resources characterized by
significant legal barriers to ownership and transfer. Removal of
these barriers would create more incentives for private entrepreneurs
to protect natural areas as well as increase the scope of activity for
non-profit conservation organizations.

Removal of these barriers

would not necessarily mean that the state would (or should) have to
relinquish all rights to wildlife, for example.

Institutions, how

ever, could be made to accommodate the efforts of people like Malcolm
Forbes who wish to establish game preserves in a natural environment.
They could also be made to accommodate groups like Hie Nature Con
servancy, who wish to protect water resources for their instream
values.
Another alternative would be the establishment of public-private
institutions that create incentives for the private protection of
natural areas. Many programs along this line are already in existence
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and are often quite successful. The most noticeable area of involve
ment is the effort by state wildlife agencies to aid private land
owners in the production and maintenance of wildlife habitat.^ Qne
interesting approach to land preservation is the Maryland Land Trust,
a state-funded easement program that works with private landowners in
much the same way as local private land trusts do.^ Another innova
tive program is the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) "stewardship"
program in which private ranchers who lease BLM land are given com
plete management authority (incentive) subject to review by a board of
ranchers and agency representatives.^ Regarding wilderness manage
ment, it has been suggested that "wilderness endowment areas" replace
the current management framework.^ Management authority would be
vested in a Congressionally appointed "wilderness endowment board"
that would be able to allow development of an area if it perceived
that a net gain in wilderness protection could be achieved through
purchase of additional areas.

All of these institutional changes

attempt to internalize costs and benefits of natural area protection
by making the decision maker more responsible with respect to his
actions.
A final alternative is the infusion of marked-type institutions
into the public sector.

These could include contracting the private

sector for such land management activities as campground and wilder
ness maintenance, fire control, timber and range surveys, and recrea
tion management.

Some of these suggestions have already been used by

certain agencies.

Another change involves the extensive use of user

charges, set at a market clearing price (based on management objec-
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tives regarding resource carrying capacity).

Hie user fees would

accomplish several things. First# they would raise revenue for the
agency. Second, they would minimize subsidies to the extent that the
charges cover the opportunitycost of the land use. Third# they would
reduce congestion problems in

popular

locations.

Fourth, they would

disperse demand for natural areas to both the private sector and less
utilized portions of the public domain. Such charges could be imple
mented for a variety of activities# ranging from campsite use to
fishing access to backcountry

travel.

As always# an equilibrium

pricing system is important for efficiency gains.
Though I have touched on several possibilities for creating
additional incentives for the private protection of natural environ
ments, I have by no means exhausted the possibilities.

Hie ideas I

have outlined could be used separately or in innovative combinations.

fimraary and Conclusions
Early in Chapter 1# I stated that the modem# conventional view
holds that the state must be actively involved in order to protect
natural environments.

The private sector is generally not trusted as

a protector of natural environments.

In direct contradiction of that

view# I presented evidence that shows that the private sector does# in
fact# protect a vast amount of natural environments.

In addition# I

presented evidence that government activity has often degraded natural
areas. The paradigm of the new resource economics# with emphasis on
the property rights theory# was used as an analytical tool to aid in
the explanation of this contradictory evidence.

Finally# I offered
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some alternative institutional (property rights) arrangements that
might be utilized to further encourage the private sector to protect
natural areas.
Although the data base for this paper is limited, there are some
modest conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis.

One such

conclusion is that the private sector (both through profit and non
profit firms) is protecting natural environments when well-specified
property rights arrangements exist.

In addition, the activity of

government was shown to be an important factor in determining the cost
of establishing and transferring rights.

Because many natural areas

have legitimate public good characteristics, government activity that
increases the cost of protecting these areas is essentially wealth
destroying.

The section that considered "institutional alternatives"

is an attempt to channel government activity toward that which reduces
the costs of protecting natural environments.

In short, this paper

suggests that the conventional wisdom regarding the role of the state
in protecting natural areas is one that overlooks the potential of the
private sector and overestimates the potential of the public sector.
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APPENDIX A
THE CONSERVATION ACTIVITIES OF
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JR.

Source:

Nancy Newhall, A Contribution
ifag Heritage £f Every
American; The Conservation Activities of John D. Rockefeller,
Jr. (New York:Alfred A. Knopf, 1957)
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The Conservation Activities of
John D. Rockefeller, Jr.
Acadia National Park (Maine)
— gave 2,700 acres of Mount Desert Island to U.S. government for
parkland
Colonial Williamsburg, Virginia
— allotted funds to aid in the purchase and restoration Of this
historic city
Forest Hill Park (Cleveland, Ohio)
— gave $10,000 and 266 acres to the city in 1938
Grand Canyon National Park (Arizona)
— gave funds to establish a museum
Grand Teton National Park (Wyoming)
— gave 30,000 acres of the Jackson Hole Basin to U.S.
government to add to park
— formed Jackson Hole Preserve Inc. in 1940
— gave $6,000,000 in 1952
Great Smoky Mountains National Park (North Carolina and Tennessee)
— gave 500,000 acres to U.S. government to help establish park
in 1926; entire park area came fran private funds and private
land
— gave $5,000,000 from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Manorial
The Hudson Valley (New York)
— gave Fort Tyron Park to New York City in 1930
Mesa Verde National Park (Colorado)
— established in museum in the 1920's
The "Palisades" (New Jersey and New York)
— gave 700 acres and $3,000,000 to Interstate Park Commission to
preserve a scenic area of tall prisms of traprock on the Hudson
River
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Redwood National Park (California)
— gave $2,000,000 to the Save-the-Redwoods-League in 1918 for
the purpose of preserving the redwood forests
— gave $1,000,000 to buy the South Calavera Grove in 1954
Shenandoah National Park (Virginia)
— contributed and aided the organizational effort to establish
the park in 1926; the park was entirely dependent upon private
funds and private land and required $1,200,000 and 193,480
acres
Virgin Islands National Park (Virgin Islands, Caribbean Sea)
— established in 1959 from land bought by the Jackson Hole
Preserve Inc.
Yosemite National Park (California)
— gave $1,750,000 in 1928 toward the purchase of more than
15,000 acres of heavily timbered forestland to be added to
the park

APPENDIX B
NON-PROFIT CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS
INVOLVED IN ACQUIRING AND MANAGING LAND

NON-PROFIT CONSERVATION ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN ACQUIRING AND MANAGING LAND

Name

/Add ress

Sates-Morris Mountain
Conservation Assn.
Maine

Purpose
To preserve and protect a
beautiful, wild Maine
beach and promote scientific
research— open to public
access for hiking and
hunt Ini'

Number of
Members
N/A

Acres
Privately donated easement
to The Nature Conservancy
then established association
to administer land which
has been leased to Bates
College Department of
Biology

Funds
N/A

See: William C. Dennis
"Private Land and Public
Amenities"

The Big Sur Land
Trusc
Carmel, California

Preserve open space along
the

N/A

A,000 protected under
aa
casement,
ownership and
9 era
lease

Approx. $80,000
since 1978

Buckeye Trail Assn.
Inc.
Worthington, Ohio

To establish a scenic trail
linking the four corners,
of Ohio

N/A

Established 900 mile
trail linking public
and private land (some
land is owned, some is
leased)

Mostly volunteer
work

Chesapeke Bay
Foundation
Anapolis, MD

Preserving natural heritage
of Chesapeke Bay

9,000 (in
1531)

Approx. 1,500 owned.
Approx. 1,100 in
conservation easements

Approx. $750,000
in 19S1

The Collier County
Conservancy
Naples, Florida

Preserving the natural
environment of Collier
Country, Florida

Purchased approx. 10,000
acres now included in
National Parks and
Seashores

Approx. $3 million
since 196A

N/A

Name/Address
Connecticut River
Watershed Council, Inc.

Ducks Unlimited
Chicago, Illinois

Purpose
N/A

Preserve and restore
waterfowl habitat

Number of
Members
1,500

425,000

Acres
3,137 acres

2.9 million in Canada
(under easement and
lease)

E3gle Valley Environ- Preservation of the
mentalists, Inc.
bald e3gie
Apple Rivers, Illinois

1 ,000+

Approx. 1,700 owned
400 easement

The Green Mountain
Club inc.
Montpelier, Vermont

Organized to build
the Long Trail, a
footpath that follows
the crest of the Green
Mountains from Massachusetts
to Canada

4,200

Maintains and protects
the 430 mile long trail
system. Footpath com
pleted in 1931. Also
operates a system of 70
shelter huts.

Izaak Walton League
of American Endowment
Iowa City, Iowa

Organized in 1943 to "help
rebuild outdoor America"
by acquiring land of
unique natural value.
Land is given to government
agencies for management

N/A

Funds
$250,000 total
revenue in 1980.
See: Terry Anderson,
John Baden, and Richard
Stroup, "Reports to
the U.S. Department
of Interior", February
1982

$25,033,100 total
revenue in 1930

N/A

40 percent of the
land is private: the
rest is government and
managed via special
use permits

Generally assist governnent acquisition by
loaning funds (by acting
quickly ex. BWCA mholdings)
Has provided land for Glacier,
Everglades and Redwood National
Parks.

N/A

Kane/Address

Purpose

Number of
Members

Acres

Funds

Jackson Hole Land Trust
Jackson, Wyoming

Preserve open land in
the Jackson Hole Valley

Hawk Mountain Sanctuary
Hawk Mountain, PA

Reserve bird habitat

Marin Agricultural Land
Trust
Novato, California

"To secure agricultural
lands in perpetuity for
agricultural uses"

N/A

Uses conservation
easements to "protect"
land-, currently have
5,900 potential acres.
See: "Marin County's
Agricultural Land Trust"
by J. Tevere MacFadyen
Country Journal, (Feb.
1983):76-83.

The Mo'nonk Preserve
New Pultz, New York

A non-profit corporation
operating a private wildlife
,preserve

N/A

5,400 owned

Preserving agricultural land

N/A

21,800 (by conservation
easement)

N/A

2,500 acres. Title has
N/A
since been transferred
to the Virginia Outdoors
Foundation (a state agency)
for management. See: Anderson
Baden and Stroup "Report to U.S.
Dept, of Interior"

Montana Land Reliance
Helena, Montana

Natural Area Council

N/A

N/A

5,500

700 acres in’easement.
Use of finding conser
vation buyers/conser
vation easements

2,000 acres owned

N/A

Daily fees for
visitors— 40,000
visitors annually

N/A

Allow hiking,
climbing— sell day
permits

N/A

Name/Address

Number of
Members

Purpose

Acres

Funds

National Audubon Society
New York, New York

(in part) preserve
wildlife and natural
environments

450,000

75 wildlife sanctuaries
Approx. 300,000 acres

Approx. $20 million
annually

National Wildlife Fed
eration
Washington, D.C.

Assists NFWS in pur
chasing land for
wildlife refuges

4,600,000

Aided NFWS in acquiring
4,200 acres of wildlife
habitat

$30,429,946
in total revenue
in 1P80

The Nature Conservancy
Arlington, Virginia

Preservation of ecological
diversity

Approx. 2.8 million
acres owned, also use
easements, voluntary
stewardship

$34,000,000 raised
in 1982

North American Wildlife
Federation
Washington, D.C.

To promote and sponsor
wildlife research

N/A

6,090 acres
See: Anderson, Baden,
and Stroup "Report to
U.S. Dept, of Interior"

N/A

The Ottaugauchee Regional
Land Trust
Woodstock, Vermont

Protecting productive
agricultural and forest
lands

N/A

Approx. 10,000 by ownership,
easement and lease

N/A

Peninsula Open Space
Trust
Menlo Parks, Calif.

Preservation of open space
in San Mateo and Santa
Clara counties, California

1,100

Ownership, voluntary
stewardship, creative
developments and easements.
Often transfer land to
public agencies for man
agement .

N/A

156,000

Name/Address

Number of
Membe rs .

Purpose

The Ruffed Grouse Society
Corapolis, Pennsylvania

Improving habitat for
forest wildlife

Save-the-Redwoods League
San Francisco, California

Preserve Redwood forest

The Sierra Club
Foundation
San Francisco, Calif.

Owns and preserves
parcels of land in'its
effort to promote environ- .
mental quality. Affiliated
with the Sierra Club. Only
accepts donations of land;
does not actively seek
acouisition

Society of Tyinpanuchas
Cupido Pinnatus Ltd.
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

Dedicated to the
preservation of the
prairie chicken

Sunny Valley Foundation
New Milford, Conneticut

Preservation of agriculture
and silviculture in the
Northeastern states

10,000

Approx. 60,000

N/A

1,200

N/A

Acres

Funds

Research, forest
consulting

$400,00.0 in 1981

230,000 now included
in California Redwood
state parks, Redwood
National Park (some
purchased, some rec
eived as gifts)

Over $37 million
since 1918

Approximately 1,000
owned, including a
parcel that contains
a shelter hut on Me.
Shasta at the 8,000
foot level

10,000 acres

2,000 acres of hiking
trails, natural areas,
and agriculture

N/A

Purchase land and
lease it to state for
prairie chicken manage
ment. Allow grazing,
haying, and other
activities which do not
harm the prairie chicken
population.

N/A

Name/Address
The Trust for Public Land
San Francisco, California

Unexpected Wildlife Refuge
Newfield, New Jersey

United States Ski
Educational Foundation
Aspen, Colorado

World Wildlife Fund - U.S.
Washington, D.C.

Purpose

Number of
Members

Preservation of urban
open space and recreational
lands

Preserve beaver and
other wildlife habitat

Operates the Alfred A. Braum
Hut System, a system of six
alpine huts located in the
Aspen-Ashcroft Wilderness
Area— $5.00/day/person—
reservations required

Wildlife preservation

Acres

N/A

84,000 acres have been
acquired and turned over
to federal, state, and
local government agencies
for management.
See: Anderson, Baden,
and Stroup "Report to
U.S. Dept, of Interior"

N/A

300 owned

N/A

Approx.
67,000

N/A

Has assisted governments
in purchase of land for
260 parks and preserves

Funds
$4,673,831 total
revenue in 1980

N/A

N/A

Approx. $2 million
annually ($3,953,505
in 1981)

See also 1981 Directory of Local Land Conservation Organization for a list of over. 400 private land conservation
groups
N/A denotes information is unavailable.

APPENDIX C
PROFIT-SEEKING INSTITUTIONS THAT
PROTECT NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS

PROFIT-SEEKING INSTITUTIONS THAT PROTECT NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS
Name/Address
Aluminum Company
of America (ALCOA)

Business

Assets

Acres

Other

Originally purchased
woodland to control
erosion and siltation
in a watershed it
would be using for
hydroelectric power

N/A

90,000 acres of
timberland

N/A

N/A

— Currently ALCOA is
working with The Ruffed
Grouse Society to improve
wildlife habitat on
30,000 acres of the Little
Tennessee River watershed

Boise Cascade Corp.
Boise, Idaho

Lease hunting on
southeast lands/open
public access of northeast
midwest and western lands/
maintain a system of
primitive public camp
grounds

N/A

2,664,000 acres

Burlington Northern
St. Paul, Minnesota

Forest products industry

N/A

1,492,000
Open land policy for
dispersed recreation.
Sells permits for
firewood.
Sells
guiding rights to
backcountry guides
and outfitters.

-Washington, Idaho.
Montana, Oregon.
Has wildlife and
watershed professionals
on their staff.

Name/Address

Business

Assets

Acres

Other
-Use prescribed fire
-Manages for trophy
whitetailed bucks
-Hires wildlife
biologists

Burnt Pine Plantation
Marietta, Georgia

Manage for quail and
deer in a natural
environment/a profit
seeking hunting preserve

N/A

Greater than
14,000 acres of
Georgia piedmont

California Land
Management Services,
Inc.
Menlo Park, Calif.

Contracts out for security,
patrol, routine maintenance,
resource management, and
interpretive services for
private and public parks,
watershed lands, recreational
facilities and open space
areas

N/A

N/A

Diamond-A Cattle Co.
Roswell, New Mexico

Working cattle operation
with fee hunting/recreational
lease on Colorado ranch

N/A

2,000,000 acres

N/A

-Boasts 20% - 30%
cost saving to
agencies
-custom tailored
contracts

Fee hunting on private
rangeland/wildlife
consultant hired to
assist landowners in
fish and game management

N/A

Approx. 250,000

N/A

Eco Realty
Ovando, Montana

Real estate firm dedi
cated to maintaining
environmental qualicy
in Montana

N/A

-Arranges conservation buyers to
protect natural
and agricultural
areas

N/A
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Eastern Slope Land
owners Association
Great Falls, Mont.

Business

Assets

Acres

Gulf Oil Corporation
Wyoming

Waterfowl habitat pro
vided by oil refinery
holding ponds

N/A

N/A

Forbes Trinchera
Ranch
Fort Garland, Colo.

Original intent to
establish a game preserve.
Now a working ranch with
fee hunting/protective
covenants on development/
environmental control
committee

N/A

180,000 acres

-Land is of high
amenity and recreational
value. Borders the
rest of the Sangre
de Cristo Mountains

H and K Hunting
Unlimited
Grassrange, Mont.

Fee hunting on private
range/land is leased
from ranchers/hunters
are limited and are
assured of a place to
hunt

N/A

200,000 acres

K and H split
revenue with the
individual land
owners

Hopcraft Ranch
Masai Group Ranch
Nairobi, Kenya

Wildgame ranching/animals
are harvested by expert
marksmen/meat is sold on
European market

N/A

International Paper
Company
Dallas, Texas

Wildlife, recreation and
aesthetics policy/hunting
leases/works with The
Nature Conservancy to
preserve natural areas

N/A

Name/Address

22,000 acres
96,000 acres

8,410,000 acres

See "Preservation for
Profit” New York Times
Magazine, September 12,
1982, pp. 50

Largest private
landowner in the
United States
N>
O

Name/Address
Kachemak Bay
Wilderness Lodge
Homer, Alaska

Business
Vacation lodge with
hiking trails ■

Acres

Assets
N/A

N-/A

N/A

Other
-Established a
nonprofit marine
research and
education project

N/A

Land Improvement
Contractors of
America
Maywood, Illinois

Organization of con
tractors involved in
land leveling, landclearing, irrigation,
erosion control,
pollution .control,
waste management,
reclamation and rec
reational construction

N/A

Liccle St. .Simons
Island
St. Simons Island,
Georgia

Pristine barrier
island retreat-resort.
Activities include
birding, hiking, fishing,
photography, etc.

N/A

12,000 acres

N/A

Lone Mountain Ranch
Big Sky, Montana

Skiing, hiking, fishing,
packing ranch

N/A

Approx. 2,000 acres

N/A

Louisiana-Pacific
Corporation
Portland, Oregon

Land is generally open
to public access/some
campgrounds and picnic
areas have been constructed

N/A

N/A

Reclaimed mining
land for agricultural
and wildlife uses

N/A

N/A
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Meadowlark Farms
Sullivan, Indiana

N/A

See: Carol L. Cornforth,
"Reclamation Commitment
Proves Rewarding." Coal.
Mining and Processing
(March 1973).

Name/Address

Business

Oregon Aqua Foods,
Inc. (owned by
Weyer'nauser Company)
Springfield, Oregon

Private salmon ranching

The Pelican Club
Carrabelle, Florida

Resort hotel on Dog
Island, a 1800-acres
barrier island off the
Florida coast. The
majority of the island
is owned by The Nature
Conservancy and main
tained in a pristine
condition

Fines Recreational
Park
Alturas, California

Provide remote backcountry recreation

Potlach Corporation
San Francisco, Calif.

Opens land to public
hunting

"An investment in
tomorrow's salmon
today"

Salmon enter the
"public" fishery of
the open ocean where
they nature

N/A

Sold over 2800
private shares

.N/A

2500 ownership shares
were sold ranging from
$4950 to $9000 per
share/shareowner is
allowed unlimited
recreational use

Acres

Owns hatchery and
return-release
site/facility

Other
Chinook, coho, and
chum salmon are raised
See: "Private Salmon
Ranching in Oregon" by
William J. McNeil,
Farm and Land Realtor,
November ,1980, pp. 8-11

1,800 acres

N/A

7,000 acres

See: "Playground for
a Price" Time, January
15, 1979, p. A 7

1.3 million

Owns forestland in
Idaho, Minnesota
and Arkansas

5,119 acres

See: Time, January
15, 197 9
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R-Ranch
Private recreation
Jeff Dennis
Siskiyou County, Calif.

Assets

Name/Address

Business •

Assets

Simpson Timber Co.
Seattle, Washington

Forest products company

N/A

St. Regis Paper
Company
New York, New York

Wildlife management
programs (especially
on their east Texas lands)/
public hunting and camping
allowed/leases to hunting
clubs/fee fishing/experi
mental forest preserves/
worked with The Nature
Conservancy to preserve
natural areas

N/A

An environmentally oriented
multi-disciplinary firm
providing planning and
engineering worldwide
(fishery consultants and
aquatic services)

N/A

United Farm Agency
Kansas City, MO

Real estate business

N/A

Weyerhauser Company
Seattle, Washington

Forest products company

N/A

N/A

Donated land to The
Nature Conservancy on
Skagit River for a
bald eagle sanctuary

N/A

3,179,000 acres

-Have been involved
-Have done stream
in a broad range of
reclamation work
-environmental engin in 17 states and
eering projects from 2 foreign countries
land reclamation to
acid mine waste
stabilization
N/A

5,923,000 acres

-Advertise for
"wilderness" buyers
specializing in
ranch/rural land
for recreationists

-Constructed perches
for bald eagle popu
lation •

See:

Peterson's Hunting, November, 1982, for a directory of private hunting preserves in 42 states.

See:

Outside, December, 1982, for a survey of private nordic skiing acres in the United States.
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"iimberline Recla
mation. Inc.
Bozeman, Montana

Other

Acres

APPENDIX D
TERMS OF SALE CONTRACT FOR CROSS RANCH
LAND OWNED BY THE NATURE CONSERVANCY
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TERMS OF SALE

1.

All bids must be in writing and filed with ttic law offices of

Atkinson, Dwyer & Klemin, P.O. Box 1176, Suite 414, Dakota Northwestern Bank
Building, 400 F.ast Broadway, Bismarck, North Dakota, on or before 2:00 p.m.,
April 22, 1982.

Bids will be opened at 2:00 p.m., April 22, 1982, in the

conference room in the basement of the Dakota Northwestern Bank Building. .
Bidders need not be present but may attend.

There shall be no right to

increase the bids orally at the time of sale.
2.

Bids may be submitted on any of Parcels I, II, III, IV,

VI, or on any combination of parcels.

Bids will not be accepted on a

V and
per

acre basis.
3.
the sum

All bids must be accompanied by an earnest money deposit in

of ten percent (10%) of the bid price in the form of a cashiers or

certified check.

The deposit will be returned to all unsuccessful bidders

on the date of sale.
4.

Seller reserves the right to reject any or all bids.

5.

The balance of the purchase price from all successful bidders

shall be due and payable within thirty (30) days from the date of sale, cr
as soon thereafter, as any necessary survey work is completed.

Seller will

provide successful bidders with a current abstract of title for buyer's
examination prior to conveyance of the property.
6.

All survey work deemed necessary by the Seller to adequately

definethe boundaries of the parcels
expense of the Seller.

conveyed shall be done by and at the
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7.

Conveyance of the parcels to successful bidders shall be made

by Warranty Deed, subject to all easements, restrictions, mineral leases,
mineral reservations, rights-of-way and exceptions of record.
8.

Seller reserves all oil, gas, coal, gravel, clay, uranium and

other minerals, with full right of ingress and egress to search for and
remove the same.
9.

Parcels I, II and III shall be used only for agricultural pur

poses and such restriction shall be contained in the deeds of conveyance.
10.

Parcels IV, V and VI shall be used only for pasture and grazing

land and shall not be plowed or cultivated.

Such restrictions shall be con

tained in the deeds of conveyance.
11.

No residential or commercial structures of any kind shall be

constructed or placed upon the property conveyed without the express written
consent of the Seller.

Such restriction shall be contained in the deeds of

conveyance.
12.

Seller reserves the right of access for itself or its agents

to all parcels for purposes of archaeological research, excavation and re
moval of artifacts, provided such activity does not unreasonably interfere
with the buyer's agricultural use of the property.
13.

Successful bidders shall be required to enter into an agreement

not to compete with the Seller for the lease on Section 36, Township 143 North,
Range 82 West for a period of five (5) years from the date of the agreement as
a condition for the conveyance of the property.
Maps of the parcels and recent title information are available upon
request.

For further information, contact Lawrence R, Klemin, P.O. Box 1176,

Bismarck, North Dakota 58502.

Telelphone (701) 255-2586.

THE W O R D "BID" SHO ULD BE C L E ARLY A N D D I S T I N C T L Y M A R K E D ON THE OUT SIDE O F THE
EN V E L O P E C O N T A I N I N G YOU R BID.

APPENDIX E
EXAMPLE OF A CONSERVATION EASEMENT
(Courtesy of the Ottauquechee Regional Land Trust)

(Farm and Forest Land Version)
137

SAMPLE CONSERVATION AGREEMENT

WARRANTY DEED
AND
GRANT OF CONSERVATION RESTRICTIONS
WHEREAS,____________________________ is the owner in fee of certuin real
property situated i n _____ _____________ ,_______________ _______ County,
Vermont, wliich h/is aesthetic, recreational and natural resource values in it3
present state, as veil as value resulting from its potential future develop
ment as residential or commercial property, which property has not yet been
subject to excessive development; and
WHEREAS, thi3 property contains
acres of open land which is presently
in active agricultural use and
acres of forested lands which is under
management for the production of forest products; and
WHEREAS, this property provides habitat for many species of game and
non-game wildlife, and is used from time to time by members of the public for
hiking, skiing, hunting, and other types of recreation; and
WHEREAS, the OTTAUQUECHEE REGIONAL LAND TRUST, INC. is a non-profit
corporation incorporated under the lavs of the State of Vermont whose purpose
is to preserve undeveloped and open space land in order to protect the
aesthetic, recreational, cultural, educational, scientific and natural
resources of the State through non-regulatory means, thereby reducing the
burdens on local and state governments; and
WHEREAS, the economic health of Vermont is closely linked to its
agricultural and forest lands, which not only produce food products, fuel,
timber and other products, but al30 provide much of Vermont's scenic beauty,
upon which the state's tourist and recreation industries depend; and
WHEREAS, the State of Vermont ha3 repeatedly sought to foster the conser
vation of the state's agricultural, forest and other natural resources through
planning, regulation, land acquisition and tax incentive programs, including,
but not limited to, Title 10 Y.S.A. Chapter 151 (Act 250); Title 24 V.S.A.
Chapter 117 (Regional and Municipal Planning and Development Act); Title 10
•V.S.A. Chapter 155 (Acquisition of Rights and Interests in Land); Title 32,
V.S.A. Chapter 124 (Current Use Taxation), Title 32 V.S.A. Chapter 231.
(Property Transfer Tax Act); and Title 32 V.S.A. Chapter 235 (Land Cains Tax);
and
WHEREAS, the parties to this Gront and Agreement recognize the ncenic and
natural values of the property, and shore the common purpose of conserving
these values by the conveyance of a conservation restriction and to prevent
the use or development of the property for any purpose or in any manner which
would conflict with the maintenance of these scenic and natural values, except
a.<i hereinafter specifically provided; and
WHEREAS, the conservation of thin property as open apace land is consis
tent with'and in furtherance of the municipal plan adopted by the Town
of
and the regional plan adopted b y _____________ ;

HOW, THEREFORE,

138

KNOW ALL PERSON BY THESE PRESENTS Hint _
of the
Tovn o f _______________ , ______________ County, Vermont, on Behalf of them
selves, their heirs, successors and assigns (hereinafter "Grantors"), in
consideration of the agreement of Crautoe to accept and enforce in perpetuity
the conservation restrictions contained .herein, and .the payment of One Dollar
and other good and valuable consideration, receipt of vhich is hereby
acknowledged, hereby grant,'sell, give, and convey unto the OTTAUQUECHEE
REGIONAL LAND TRUST, INC., a Vermont non-profit corporation organized and
existing under the lava of the State of Vermont, having its principal place of
business in Woodstock, Vermont, its successors and assigns (hereinafter
"Grantee"), a certain parcel of land lying and being in, __________________
County, State of Vermont (hereinafter referred to as "Parcel A", in fee simple
absolute, free from all encumbrances except those rights and restrictions
further reserved herein to the Grantors, such Parcel A being described as
follows:
A __________ -shaped parcel of land containing
acres, more or
less, vhich is part of the land and premises conveyed to Crantors by
Warranty deed of ■
■
_____ doted ________
_______ , recorded at Book _____ , Page
of the
Land
Records, to which deed, and the deeds and plans referred to therein,
reference may be had for a more complete description. A further descrip
tion may he had by reference to a survey map prepared by _________________
_________ , dated _______________ , entitled_______________________________
________________ ______ , and recorded simultaneously herewith, at Book ___,
LandRecords,such
-shapedparcelbeing
Page _____ of the
designated as Parcel A upon such survey map. This conveyance is made to
gether with the right of access over and across Parcel B, so identified
upon the above-described survey map, the exact location of such access to
be determined from time to time by the Grantors at a location providing
reasonable ingress and egress to the Grantee, its successors and assigns..
Such right of access shall constitute an appurtenance to said Parcel A,
and shall run with the land in perpetuity.
The said Parcel A is conveyed together with-the appurtenant benefit of a
perpetual conservation easement and restriction (as more particularly set
forth below) across certain other lands of Grantors (hereinafter referred to
"Parcel B" or "Protected Property") contiguous with the land3 conveyed in fee
to Grantee hereunder, said Parcel B being more particularly described as
follows:
A __________ -shaped parcel of land containing _______ acres, more
or less, which is part of the land and premises conveyed to Grantors by
________________________ ,d a t e d _________
Warranty Deed of ________________ .
, recorded at Book _______ , Page
of the
Land Records, to which deed, and the deeds and plans referred to therein,
reference may be had for a more particular description. A further
description may be had by reference to the survey map prepared by
___________________________dated •______
__
, entitled
_ _____________
andrecordedsimultaneouslyhereinatBook
,
Page
___ of the
I.nndRecords, such
-shaped
parcel being designated as Parcel B under such survey roup.
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The righto grunted to Grnntco consint of covenantn on the part of the
Grnntoro to do or refrain from doing, nevcrally and collectively, the vurioua
acta net forth belov. It in hereby agreed that theac covenant:) shall
constitute a servitude upon the land and will. be for the benefit of the
Crnntce which ac.ceptn and agrees to enforco ouch covenants on behalf and for
the benefit of the general public, through the preservation of wildlife
habitats', non-commercial recreational opportunities and activities, productive
agricultural and forestry uses, and other natural and ocenic valuea of tho
Protected Property for present and future generations,
THE RESTRICTIONS hereby imposed upon the above described Property, and
the acts which Grantors shall do-or refrain from doing, are
follows:
1.
The Protected Property 3hall be used for agriculture, forestry,
non-commerical recreation, and open space purposes only. No residential,
commercial, industrial, or mining activities 3hall be permitted, and no
building or structure shall be constructed, created, erected or moved onto the
property, except 83 specifically reserved by the Grantors under this Grant.
2.
No rights-of-way, easements of ingress or egress, driveways-, roads,
or utility lines shall be constructed, developed or maintained into, on, over,
under or across the property, except as specifically reserved by the Grantors
under this Grant.

3*
There shall be no signs, billboards, or outdoor advertising of any
kind erected or displayed; provided, however, that the Grantors may erect and.
maintain reasonable boundary markers, directional signs, signs restricting
hunting or trespassing on the property, memorial plaques, and temporary signs
indicating that the property is for sale or lease. In addition, small signs
informing the public if any agricultural or timber products for sale or being
grown on the premises are permitted. Grantee, with the permission of
Grantors, may erect and maintain signs designating the property as land under
the protection of the Grantee.
4*
The placement, collection or storage of trash, ashes, human and
agricultural waste, sawdust, vehicles or equipment, or any unsightly or
offensive material on the property shall not be permitted except at such
locations, if any, and in such a manner 03 shall be approved in advance in
writing by Grantee. The'spreading of manure, lime, or other fertilizer for
agricultural practices shall he permitted without such prior written approval.
5.
There shall be no disturbance of the surface, including but not
limited to filling, excavation, removal of topsoil, sand, gravel, rocks or
minerals, or change of the topography of the land in any manner, except us may
bo reasonably necessary to carry out the uses permitted on the Protected
Property under the terms of this Agreement, provided that in no case 3boll
surface mining of subsurface oil, gas or other minerals be permitted.
6.

The Protected Property shall not be subdivided.

7.
No use shall be made of the premises, and no activity thereon shall
be permitted which, in the reasonable opinion of the Grantee, is or may
possess the potential to become inconsistent with the intent of this grant,
such intent being the prcservaton of the premises predominantly in its natural

I'll)

condition, the protection of cnviroiunentnl systems, the protection of the
property's acenic benuty, and the encouragement of the sound utilization and
conservation of agricultural and forent resources.
NOTWITHSTANDING THE POREGOINC, Grantors reserve the following rights in
the Protected Property:
1.
The right to establish, reestablish, maintain and use cultivated
fields, orchards, and pastures in accordance with generally accepted agri
cultural practices and sound husbandry principles.
2.
The right to conduct maple sugaring operations in accordance with
generally accepted practices.
2*
The right to harvest timber and other vood products, together with
the right to construct and maintain logging roads necessary to effect such
harvest, in accordance vith generally ucceptcd forestry practices and in
accordance vith a forest management plan for vhich Grantor has received the
prior vritten approval of Crantee, eicept that Grantors may harvest firewood
for heating residences and structures located on the Protected Property
without submission and approval of a plan. Grantee's approval of forest
management plnn3 that may bo submitted from time to time shall not bo
unreasonably withhold or conditioned, if such plans have been approved by a
professional forester and if such plans do not violate the terms of this
Agreement. Disapproval by Grantee of a forest management plan proposing a
clearcut (removal of more than 15 % of the basal area) shall not be deemed
unreasonable. However, Grantee may approve such plan in its discretion if
consistent vith the purposes of this Agreement, such as to permit the planting
of a different species of trees or the establishment or reestablishment of a
field, pasture or garden.
4.
The right to utilize, maintain, establish, construct and improve
water sources, courses, and bodies within the Protected Property for U3es
otherwise permitted hereunder, provided that Grantors do not unnecessarily
disturb the natural course of the surface water drainage and runoff flowing
over the property. The construction of ponds or reservoirs shall be permitted
only upon the prior written approval of Grantee. Such approval shall not be
unreasonably withheld or conditioned, unless such construction would conflict
with an important purpose of this Agreement, such as the protection of a
natural resource or wildlife habitat.
5.
The right to clear, construct, and maintain trails for walking,
horseback riding, skiing, and other non-motorized recreational activities
within and across the Protected Property, eicept that snowmobile travel shall
also be permitted.
IT IS HEREBY AGREED that the construction of any buildings, strictures or
improvements, or any use of the land, otherwise penaitted under this Agree
ment, shall be in accordance with all applicable ordinances, statutes and
regulations of the Town o f ___________ _____ and the State of Vermont.
CRANTEE shall make reasonable efforts from time to time to assure com
pliance by Grantors with all of the covenunts and restrictions herein. In
connection with such efforts, Grantee may make periodic inspection of all or
any portion of the Protected Property, and for such inspection and enforcement
purposes, the Grantee shall have tlie right of reasonable access to all of
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Parcel B. In the event that Crantee becomes aware of an event or circuinntance
of non-complionce with the terms and conditions herein aet forth, Crantee
shall give notice to Grantors of such event or circumstance of non-compliance
via certified mail, return receipt requested, and demand corrective action
sufficient to abate such event or circumstance of non-complinnco and restore
the Protected Property to its previous condition. Failure by the Grantors to
cause discontinuance, abatement or such other corrective action as may be
demanded by Grantee within 40 hours after rcccipto of notico shall entitle
Crantee to bring an action in a court of competent jurisdicton to enforce the
terns of this Agreement nnd to recover, any damages arising from such noncompliance. Such damages, when recovered, may be applied by Grantee to
corrective action on the Protected Property, if necessary.
If such Court
determines that Grantors have failed to comply with this Agreement, Grantors
shall reimburse Grantee for any reasonable costs of enforcement, including
court costa and reasonable attorneys fees, in addition to any o.ther payments
ordered by such Court. The parties to tlds Grant specifically acknowledge
that events and circumstances of non-compliance constitute immediate and
irreparable injury, loss and damage to the Protected Property and, accord
ingly, entitle Crantee to such equitable relief, including but not limited to
injunctive relief, as the Court deems ju3t. The remedies described herein are
in addition to, and not in limitation of, any other remedies available to
Grantee at law, in equity or through administrative proceedings.
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that Grantors reserve to the benefit of Prrcol B con
servation easements and restrictions encumbering Parcel A, such reserved
easements and restrictions to be the same as those conveyed to Grantee herein
encumbering Parcel B, and to be appurtenant to Parcel B, permanent and per
petual, and running with the land. Grantee hereby agrees that those persons
owning Parcel B from time to time shull have the use and enjoyment of Parcel
A, to the extent that such possession, use and enjoyment are not inconsistent
with the rights and obligations, easements, and restrictions convoyed to the
Crantee by this deed.
The Grantors shall pay all real estate taxes and assessments levied by
competent authorities against the Protected Property, as well as against
Parcel A, and shall hold Granteee harmless from
the same.
INVALIDATION of any provision hereof shall
of this Agreement.

not affect any other provision

TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said granted premises, with all the privileges and
appurtenances thereof, to the said Gruntee, OTTAUQUECHEE REGIONAL LAND TRUST,
INC., its successors and assigns, to their own use and behoof forever; and we
________________ for ourselves and our
the said Grantors, ___________________ .
heirs, executors and administrators, do covenant with the said "Grantee,
OTTAUQUECHEE REGIONAL LAND TRUST, INC., it3 successors nnd assigns, that until
the ensealing of these presents we are the sole owners of the premises, and
have good right nnd title to convey the same in
the munner
uforcsaid,that
they arc free from every encumbrance, nnd wo hereby engage
to warrantand
defend the same against all lawful claims whatever.

of

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we set our handB and seals thin
, 198 .

day
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Signed, sealed nnd dcliverod in
the presence of:

CRANTORS:

Vitnose to Both

Witness to Both

___________________________
Witness

GRANTEE:
OTTAUQUECHEE REGIONAL LAND TRUST,
INC.

Vitneaa

By:___________________________
Its Duly Authorized Agent

STATE OF VERMONT
VIHDSOR COUNTY, ss.
At ___

, Vermont, this______ day o f _____________, 1S8_,

_____________________ _______________________________ personally appeared and
acknowledged this instrument, by ________ sealed and subscribed, to
b e _________ free act and deed.
Before me,
Notary Public

STATE OF VERMONT
WINDSOR COUNTY, os.
At

________________ _« Vermont, this _____ day of

, 198_,

_______________ , duly authorized officer of the Ottauquechee
Regional Land Trust, Inc., personally appeared and _____ acknowledged this
instrument, by

.

scaled and subscribed to be ____ free act and deed nnd

the free act and deed of the Ottauquechee Regional Land Trust, Inc.
Beforo me,
Notary Public

APPENDIX F
EXAMPLE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS DESIGNED TO
PROTECT NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS

Source:

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions for
Forbes Park, Costilla County, Colorado, pp. 8,9.
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ARTICIE VIII
PROTECTIVE COVENANTS
The following restrictions, conditions and covenants, collectively cal^d "Protective Covenants", are imposed upon all lltc Lots, Condominium Units wliere
applicable, and Common Areas without limiting or altering Hie provisions ol Article VII
(a)

Any tank lor tlie storage ol gas or liquid shall be hidden horn Hie view ol oilier lots and llie Common Area,

(b) No kennel or other facility lor raising or hoarding dogs or otiier animals lor commercial purposes shall be kept in Forties Park No animals ol any
kind shall be raised, bred or kept in f orbes Park except reasonable numbers o! dogs, cats or other ordinary household pets. No poultry may he kept in
Forbes Park No dog shall be allowed to run loose except when accompanied by a peison capable of keeping such dog under surveillance and control.
(c) All relure, rubbish, trash, garbage or waste shall be kept disposed of or removed in a sanitary manner. All household refuse and rubbish, trash,
garbage or waste shall be kept in closed containers inside a building or other approved enclosure until taken, to a disposal place operated or licensed
by the proper public authonty lor such disposal. Nonhoutehold retuse, rubbish, (rash, garbage, or waste, oilier than dead leaves and fallen limbs shall
not be permitted to remain exposed on a Lol
. (d) Any veh.cle, whether selfpropelted or not permitted to remain on any Lol or Common Area shall be kept in a licensed and operable condition. Any
vehicle, whether sclfpropefed or ncL shall be parked m such a manner that it is not a nuisance, aesthetically or olher.vise. to other Mernbere. A truck
larger than three-quarter (3/4) ton rating shall only be kept on a Lot inside an approved ouilcfing except during any period ol authorized construction. A
vehicle shall not be parked on that part cl any road normally used by vehicles being dnven on such road. The provisions ol this paragraph shall not
apply to Declarant during time of construction ol roads.
(e) Noxious, obnoxious, nosy, unsightly or otherwise offensive objects or activities, specifically including vehicle repairs, barking dogs and littering
shall npl be permitted nor shall anything be permitted that may be an unreasonable annoyance or nuisance to other Owners.
(I)
A professional quality sign of not more than four (4) square feet in area shall be allowed to be displayed on a Lot for any purpose and one (1)
additional sign of not more than four (4) square feet in area shall be allowed to be displayed lor advertising such Lot or improvement thereon for sale,
lease or renl
(g) A structure of a temporary or mob!'.’ nature, motorhome. mobile home, camper ti uck travel trailer, camping tiailer, oilier vehicle used or designed lor
camping, or tent, shall not be plaixd on a Lot lor more tlu n three (3) consecutive nights and days more than once each calendar month except that tlie
Committee may grant a permit (1) (or any of the above to be placed on a lo t and used for longer periods ol lime during construction of a dwelling
diligently pursued, or, (2) for vacation camping under the conditions and procedures provided in Article VII liereof. Subject lo the prior wirttun approval
of Declarant, with respect to the real property described in Exhibit C, the Board may designate a part of the Common Area as a Storage area for all
vehicles that are prohibited from being placed on a LoL
(h) All septic systems operated with water from wells drilled under permits obtained pursuant to the Decree of the District Court in and for Water
Division No. 3, State of Colorado, Case No. W-3312. shall be limited to sewage disposed of by septic tank and absoi|rtiori fields, the eflluent of which shall
return to groundwater in the drainage basins in which such wells are located. Said absorption fields and septic lank installations shall be constructed in
conformance with the standards and requirements of state and county health authorities. Nowithstanding the foregoing requirements, the Committee
may approve an evaporative field septic system il the construction of a septic tank and absorption field would cause a hardship in any particular situa
tion and if the Committee is permitted to do so under a modification of the Decree in Case No. W-3312.
(i) Any outdoor fire shall be made in a facility or a receptacle having a properiy operating spark screen. All fireplaces whether inside a building or out
doors shalll have an operational approved spark scfeen covering the top cf ttie chimney. Any condition which creates a fire hazard shall not be per
mitted on a Lol
6)
No single-family residence or Condominium U n it exclusive of open porches, garages and carports, shall be less than six hundred (500) square
feet in main floor area. No more than one (1) single-family residence plus appropriate ancillary buildings may hie erected on a Lot nol designated a Com
mercial LoL No commune, cooperative or similar type living arrangement shall be permitted a n yw k’ re in Forbes Park
(k) All water derived from wells permitted by the State Engineer of the State of Colorado pursuant to tlie previsions of the Decree of the District Court
in and for Water Division No. 3, State of Colorado, in Case No. W-3312, shall be used for domestic in-house use only.
(I)

No commercial enterprise shall be operated other than on a Commercial Lot.

(m) Building matenals shall not be placed on a lo t nor shall foundation work be skirted for any Improvement unless such Improvement lias previous
ly been approved by Hie Committee. Once approval is otitaincd, such Improvement must be completed within twelve (12) months after building mate- •
rials are first placed on such Lot or foundation work ts begun.
(n) A wire fence shall nol be permitted on a Lot except one such fence enclosing nol more than 1600 square feet for Hie purpose of enclosing house
hold pets.
(o)

Hunting sh3ll not be permitted.

(p) Firearms, explosives, fireworks or arrows shall not be used, shot or discharged except in such areas as may be designated by the Association for
such use, shooting or discharging
(q)

Explosives shall not be used tor construction purposes unless such use has been approved by tlie Committee.
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(r)

Excessively noisy vehicles o! any kind, all terrain vehicles, tra il-b ite , helicopters, aircraft or motorcycles shall not be tised anywhere in fo rte s Park.

(s) Chain saws sJialt not be used without a proper spark arrester on the exhaust and chain saws or other noisy equipment shall not be operated before
800 A id. or after 5:00 PM.
(I) All tctepfxne, etedricel power, and tfte r receiving! or transmission lines shall be [taced unckerpj cHiisd except that such lines on poles shall be per
mitted (1) in the case ol major lines to a,mas of Forbes Park as Declarant dooms appropriate and (?) wlx-re tire Committee determines underground lines
are umeasonaWy expensne or otherwise impractical.
(u) Existing tree lines on all Lots and Commercial Lots shall not be disturbed or altered and, wlierevcr practicable, all improvements shall be placed a
reasonable distance behind such tree lines as determined by the'Committee.
(v)

Any tree having a diameter at the base greater than four (4) inches shall not be cut down without pnor approval of the Committee.

(w)

A lo t sfiall not be subdivided or partially teased except a Commercial Lot owned by Declarant

(x) Snowmobiles shal< not be operated except in transit to or from such parts of tlie Common Areas as the Association and Declarant may from time
tq time designate as snow mo tilin g areas.
(y) Any vehicle requiring its operator to have an operator's license under the laws of the State ol Colorado shall be operated only by a person having a
valid operator’s license.
(?)

All improvements shaft be maintained in such a manner tlu t tliey do not become (1) unsightly, (?) in disrepair, (3| unsanitary or (4) a fire hazard.

(aa) No guest house, garage, carport or other outbuilding shall be constructed on any L d until afier commencement of construction ol the dwelling
house on the same lol
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